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Abstract 
 
Mental illness and suicide present vexing challenges for journalists who seek to elevate public 
understanding of public health issues and remedies. Using the theoretical frameworks of media 
agenda setting and issue framing, content analysis was used to examine a nationwide sample of 
newspapers stories for evidence of media familiarity with prevailing norms for community 
mental health care and suicide prevention. Stories examined showed little evidence of such 
expertise, leaving questions about the ability of journalists — and their readers — to differentiate 
between standard and substandard mental health care systems.  Long-term change in public 
policy about mental illness and suicide prevention will likely depend on the ability of special 
interests to capture and keep media attention as well as media management decisions to assign 
mental health coverage to general assignment reporters or place it in the hands of journalists with 
specialized training. 
 
 
  
 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
LIST	  OF	  FIGURES	  	  .............................................................................................................	  iv	  
LIST	  OF	  TABLES	  ................................................................................................................	  v	  
DEDICATION	  .....................................................................................................................	  vi	  
CHAPTER	  1	  -­‐	  INTRODUCTION	  AND	  BACKGROUND	  ..............................................	  1	  THE	  MEDIA	  AND	  MENTAL	  ILLNESS	  ............................................................................................	  3	  MENTAL	  ILLNESS	  OFFICIALLY	  DECLARED	  A	  MAJOR	  HEALTH	  ISSUE	  .....................................	  5	  
CHAPTER	  2	  -­‐REVIEW	  OF	  LITERATURE	  .....................................................................	  7	  NATIONAL	  NORMS	  AND	  CONSENSUS	  REPORTS	  .......................................................................	  7	  MASS	  MEDIA	  AND	  MENTAL	  ILLNESS	  RESEARCH	  .................................................................	  24	  DISSENTING	  VOICES	  ..................................................................................................................	  29	  MEDIA	  FRAMING:	  A	  RESEARCH	  FRAMEWORK	  ......................................................................	  33	  RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  ............................................................................................................	  42	  
CHAPTER	  3	  -­‐METHODOLOGY	  ....................................................................................	  49	  
THE	  CODING	  INSTRUMENT	  .......................................................................................................	  51	  SEARCH	  CRITERIA	  .....................................................................................................................	  55	  TESTING	  THE	  CODING	  INSTRUMENT	  ......................................................................................	  57	  DESCRIPTION	  OF	  THE	  CODED	  SAMPLE	  ...................................................................................	  58	  
CHAPTER	  4	  -­‐	  RESULTS	  .................................................................................................	  61	  
CHAPTER	  5	  -­‐	  DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  ....................................................	  72	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  ...................................................................................................................	  75	  
REFERENCES	  ...................................................................................................................	  81	  
APPENDIX	  ........................................................................................................................	  91	  
  
 
iv 
 
 
 
List of Figures  
 
Appendix A - Coding instrument ................................................................... 91 
Appendix B -Episodic media sample ............................................................. 92 
Appendix C -Thematic media sample ............................................................ 93 
Appendix D - Editorial media sample ........................................................... 94 
Appendix E - Suicide memorial controversy ................................................. 95 
 
 
 
  
 
v 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Population of qualified media sample ........................................... 55 
Table 3.2 Description of coded sample by circulation size ........................... 58 
Table 3.3 Distribution of coded sample by story type ................................... 59 
Table RQ1.1  .................................................................................................. 61 
Table RQ1.2 ................................................................................................... 62 
Table RQ1.3 ................................................................................................... 62 
Table RQ1.4 ................................................................................................... 62 
Table RQ2.1 ................................................................................................... 63 
Table RQ2.2 ................................................................................................... 64 
Table RQ2.3 ................................................................................................... 64 
Table RQ2.4 ................................................................................................... 64 
Table RQ3.1 ................................................................................................... 66 
Table RQ3.2 ................................................................................................... 66 
Table RQ3.3 ................................................................................................... 67 
Table RQ3.4 ................................................................................................... 67 
Table RQ4.1 ................................................................................................... 68 
Table RQ4.2 ................................................................................................... 69 
Table RQ5.1 ................................................................................................... 69 
Table RQ6.1 ................................................................................................... 70 
Table RQ6.2 ................................................................................................... 70 
Table RQ6.3 ................................................................................................... 71 
Table RQ6.4 ................................................................................................... 71
  
 
vi 
 
 
 
Dedication 
Knowing is not enough; we must apply. 
Willing is not enough; we must do. 
— Goethe 
 
It is said that science protects us against the mistakes of daily inquiry, which is to say that it 
protects us from ourselves. Independent, objective inquiry demands that our questions begin with 
what exists, not what we wish existed. Smart science, like smart journalism, cannot determine 
what should be without first understanding what is and how it came to pass. 
For their leadership and instruction, I am grateful to the members of my faculty advisory 
committee at Kansas State University:  William Adams, Ph.D., Joye Gordon, Ph.D.; Louise 
Benjamin, Ph.D., as well as Gloria Freeland, journalism assistant professor and ex-officio 
committee member. The support of my students and fellow graduate students was more than I 
expected; the support of my family was more than I deserved. 
Lastly, this project would not have been possible, or necessary, without those whose research 
on mental illness and suicide has preceded mine, whose questions have inspired mine. Research 
does not always produce solutions; many questions yield no answers, only more questions. 
Together, however, questions and research have the power to replace fear and ignorance with 
understanding and knowledge.  
— dvc
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
Mental illness and suicide are inextricable components of a global health threat. They 
dwarf the frequency and severity of diseases that generate far more risk perception by the public 
and the news media. Mental illnesses account for nearly 1 million deaths and an estimated 10 
million attempted suicides each year (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2012). 
In the United States, an estimated 54 million people — 1 in 5 — suffer a treatable mental 
illness (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012). Each year, local coroners 
checkmark the box labeled “suicide” on more than 35,000 death certificates. If there existed a 
similar system to track attempted suicides, HHS surveys suggest the tally would easily top 
500,000 annually (President’s Commission, 2003). The Centers for Disease Control estimates 
that mental illnesses affect nearly one in five children and cost $247 billion yearly in medical 
bills, special education and juvenile justice (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 
2013). Nationwide, according to the CDC, suicide is the second leading cause of death (after 
accidents) among children ages 12 to 17. 
During the past 20 years, the tangle of variables that lead to mental illness and suicide has 
been repeatedly unraveled to shape and refine a set of standardized policy measures that must be 
in place before communities and their school systems can achieve long-lasting reductions in the 
number of youth suicides as well as the number of those suffering various types of mental illness 
that often lead to suicide. A great deal is known about such standards and how they came to pass. 
The same cannot be said regarding news media standards for covering this difficult issue. The 
purpose of this study is not to analyze the health care standards or the scholarly work that led to 
their establishment. Rather, the purpose of this study is to more fully understand the news 
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media’s ability to evaluate existing mental health care through the lens of what is supposed to 
exist.  
Mental illness drew scant attention from the American public and news media until events 
in the 1980s made it a story impossible to ignore. A sharp increase in youth suicide rates created 
headlines about a phenomenon that heretofore had been closely tracked only in obscure quarters 
of public health epidemiology and the emerging disciplines of behavioral science and adolescent 
psychiatry (Grob, 2011). By the late eighties, diagnostic and mortality findings had seeped from 
the medical community into the general population. Nationwide curiosity morphed into 
nationwide alarm after a series of suicide “clusters” that left grieving loved ones holding suicide 
notes that spoke of deep-seated resentments and cultural alienation. The most famous of these 
was the March 1987 cluster of teen suicide sin Bergenfield, N.J. The incidence of such tragedies 
— or at least the public nature of such tragedies — launched renewed zeal for new knowledge 
that might explain, if not predict or prevent, localized suicide clusters. What journalists and lay 
bystanders once stereotyped as “copycat suicides” eventually matured into scholarly acceptance 
of “suicide contagion theory” (Gould, 1990; Shaffer, 1994). Contagion theory ignited a stampede 
of research that continues today, most of it focused on the relationship — assuming one exists — 
between suicide and the mass media. By the late 1990s, contagion theory had worked its way, 
and its warnings, deep into the heart of scholarly thought about how journalists write about 
suicide, and how they ought to write about it. Warnings about the risk of too much coverage also 
became standard language in the official “crisis response” and “crisis communications” protocols 
adopted by American school systems (Brock & Lazarus, 2012, Chapter 11). 
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The media and mental illness 
Applying traditional news standards to a once-taboo topic proved vexing to American news 
media. Most print and broadcast media have longstanding policies, only occasionally put in 
writing, stipulating that suicides are covered only when they involve public officials/celebrities 
or when they occur in public places (Tatum, Canetto, & Slater, 2010). Such editorial judgment 
reflects traditional social concerns about media intrusion into the private lives of the privately 
mourning. Digging into the deceased’s history or searching for explanations can unwittingly 
inflict public embarrassment upon the grieving and exacerbate their suffering (Jamison, 1999). 
While media thinking about the bounds of privacy would eventually be rethought in the wake of 
school massacres and public shootings yet to come, the media coverage continued to reflect the 
general public sentiment that mental illness and suicide involve the private problems of private 
families (Ruggiero, 2007). 
The mass media’s first investigation into public attitudes about mental illness was not the 
work of a newspaper or television station but, rather, a freelance journalist. Ten years after the 
Bergenfield suicide cluster, Donna Gaines visited the New Jersey community to reassemble the 
lives and events that ended with a tragedy that had generated short-term shock but little long-
term analysis. Gaines’ best-seller, Teenage Wasteland: Suburbia’s Dead End Kids presented the 
Bergenfield suicides not as a local story or isolated tragedy but as one page in a story of teenaged 
depression and despair being played out across America’s middle-class (Gaines, 1998, Chapter 
7). Suburban adolescents, seething with resentment and defiance, were isolating themselves from 
those who might have been in a position to intervene. Eventually, isolation led to depression, and 
depression to hopelessness. Whatever the specific symptoms, Gaines concluded, the Bergenfield 
teens died from a malady that had gone undiagnosed but not unnoticed. Those who saw warning 
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signs told Gaines they didn’t know what the signs meant or where to find help. They recalled an 
abiding fear in the community that the quality of life was being threatened by the growing 
number of “alternative” youth whose music, clothing and lifestyle had taken on a “defiant” and 
“alternative” posture (Gaines, 1998, p. 195-196). 
Wasteland was heralded as a warning shot for communities, especially the middle-class and 
its school systems. The message:  Learn the warning signs of mental illness and find out where to 
get help. Wasteland’s message would later prove prescient but the book’s first release in 1991 
did little to catapult youth depression or mental illness in general onto the public and media 
priority lists. Most communities had already established an agenda that targeted juvenile 
violence, drinking and drug abuse. In his highly acclaimed, The Road to Whatever, author-
sociologist-criminologist Elliott Currie dubbed the 1990s the “juvenile crackdown decade,” 
notable for its tough-love discipline and “zero tolerance” policies in schools and courtrooms 
(Currie, 2005). Congress opened the government’s wallet for schools and communities willing to 
launch substance abuse campaigns. The national assumption, Currie wrote, was that drugs and 
drinking caused teenage depression and suicidal thoughts. Few had considered reversing the 
equation. Was it possible that depression and suicidal thoughts drove people to medicate 
themselves with alcohol and drugs? 
Lacking knowledge of mental illness and its origins, communities also lacked a rationale 
for interventions other than those aimed at substance abuse. As the nineties came to a close, 
mental health researchers were about to receive the first promising reports of successfully tested 
programs and strategies for early detection of mental illness and suicidal ideation (Shaffer & 
Craft, 1999; Gould, Greenberg, Velting, & Shaffer, 2003). The newly developed interventions, 
however, presumed that communities would welcome recommendations from outside experts 
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rather than try to re-invent the wheels of mental health research. This presumption had not 
considered the magnitude to which political and cultural pressure affected the decisions of 
locally elected school boards. What scholars and scientists considered a grave public health 
issue, some considered a breach of cherished values regarding family privacy and the inviolate 
nature of parenthood. School board meetings across the nation were standing-room-only when 
the agenda included proposals for early detection of depression and other mental illnesses 
(UCLA Center for Mental Health in Schools, 2005). To this day, according to the National 
Association of School Psychologists, many school systems readily take part in “awareness” 
campaigns that advise troubled students where to turn for help but resist proposals to require 
formal suicide prevention training for teachers and counselors (Poland, 2010). 
Mass communications research has repeatedly concluded that information and awareness 
do not always produce response and action (Lippmann, 1922). As the 1990s neared an end, the 
nation’s highest-ranking health official announced that it was time to take action. 
 
Mental illness officially declared a major public health issue  
In March 1999 the U.S. Surgeon General issued the nation’s first official pronouncement 
that mental illness was a major public health problem and suicide its “avoidable outcome” 
(Satcher, 1999). Mental health research, the Surgeon General said, had undergone “a scientific 
revolution” that had already begun generating “safe and effective” diagnostic tools to intercept 
and treat the disease. The major obstacle to scientific progress, the Surgeon General said, were 
persistent cultural myths that stigmatized suicide as the inevitable fate of star-crossed misfits 
under the malignant pull of an evil presence too dangerous to confront. The Surgeon General’s 
message would be repeated over the next decade in three additional consensus reports, each one 
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presenting the increasingly detailed ingredients of community mental health care as identified by 
an increasingly wider circle of scholars and clinicians. (National Strategy, 2001; President’s 
Commission, 2003; National Strategy, 2012). Each national report expanded the inventory of 
evidence-based models for early detection of mental illnesses and reducing suicide among high-
risk populations. Each report expanded the knowledge base of remedies for early interception of 
mental illness and suicidal thought. In 2003, The President’s New Freedom Commission on 
Mental Health stitched the accumulated body of knowledge and remedies into a step-by-step 
map for community intervention.  
The 2003 report also offered the authors’ accumulated frustration. It described the nation’s 
mental health care system as, “a system that	  manages	  symptoms	  and	  accepts	  long-­‐term	  disability … a patchwork relic — the result of disjointed	  reforms	  and	  policies.	  Instead	  of	  ready	  access	  to	  quality	  care,	  the	  system	  presents	  barriers	  that	  all	  too	  often	  add	  to	  the	  burden	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  for	  individuals,	  their	  families	  and	  our	  communities.”	  The	  time	  had	  passed,	  the	  report	  stated,	  for	  “yet	  another	  piecemeal	  approach	  to	  mental	  health	  reform	  and	  suicide	  prevention.	  “	  	  	  The	  authors	  concluded	  that	  only	  a	  “fundamental	  transformation”	  would	  ensure	  that	  the	  mentally	  ill	  and	  suicidal	  “receive	  the	  same	  quality	  of	  care	  available	  to	  other	  Americans“	  (Office	  of	  the	  President,	  2003,	  Executive	  Summary).	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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
This project is not an attempt to evaluate the quality of mental health care in the United States 
or the progress achieved in reducing the incidence of suicide. Rather, this investigation looks solely 
at published coverage of mental health issues in search of evidence that journalists possess sufficient 
training to sort out the difference between communities that have adopted national standards for 
mental health care and communities that have not. Any analysis of media proficiency on an issue 
commands that one first establish the relevant base of knowledge that may signal media proficiency. 
Accordingly, the Literature Review’s first priority was to identify and assemble primary source 
documents that offer the most complete body of knowledge about prevailing standards for 
community mental health care and suicide prevention initiatives. Secondly, this review combed 
relevant libraries and databases for other examples of research into media coverage of mental illness 
and/or suicide. Thirdly, this review identifies the mass communications theories most pertinent to 
this investigation. Lastly, this review presents a set of necessary research questions that emerge from 
the review of scientific literature. 
 
Identification of national norms and consensus reports 
The nation’s prevailing standards for community mental health care and suicide prevention are 
found in a series of four nationwide research expeditions that began in late 1999 and most recently 
culminated in the autumn of 2012. All four contained detailed roadmaps for community mental 
health response, step-by-step instructions that were published with the intent of providing 
communities a “template” and discouraging communities from turning to homemade or locally 
designed methodologies.  
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Following are the four landmark studies that contain the prevailing standards and policies for 
community mental health care and suicide prevention: 
 
The 1999 U.S. Surgeon General’s “Call To Action” reports 
The 1999 Surgeon General’s report reflected an emerging scholarly concern that American 
communities had been given responsibility for local mental health care without concomitant 
standards and protocols for the design and delivery of such care. The Surgeon General David 
Satcher’s 1999 “Call to Action” report was actually a matched pair of twin statements about the 
threat of mental illness and suicide. The documents represented the federal government’s first 
official declaration that mental illness and suicide were to be treated as a public health issues with no 
less national urgency than that applied to other health issues. Surgeon General David Satcher called 
his report a “blueprint” and “framework” based on  “evidence-based and highly prioritized 
recommendations by leading experts.” The terms “blueprint” and “framework” and “strategy” would 
find their way into the three national consensus reports that followed the Surgeon General’s. Satcher 
said that mental illness and suicide required the same intervention models and methodologies used to 
combat other health issues: define the problem, identify causes and protective factors, develop and 
test intervention techniques, and, implement the consensus strategies. Satcher challenged the nation 
to “chart a course” for  “constructive public health policy, measurable overall objectives, and ways 
to monitor and evaluate progress toward these objectives.” His repeated use of the language of 
institutionalized public health practices caught the attention of many, including the National Alliance 
on Mental Illness, the nation’s largest advocacy organization for the mentally ill. NAMI hailed the 
Surgeon General report as the first step in “codifying the consensus best practices of what is 
currently scientifically known” regarding suicide prevention and mental illness. U.S. Secretary of 
Health and Human Services Donna E. Shalala referred to the Surgeon General recommendations as 
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“seminal reports” that “provide us an opportunity to dispel the myths and stigma surrounding mental 
illness” and advance the argument that “mental health is fundamental health.” 
Lastly, the Surgeon General called upon communities to address a barrier that continues to 
frustrate health experts to this day — the lack of current local data regarding the victims of mental 
illness and suicide. Such data, Satcher said, is essential in order to define the health problem from 
community to community. Community success, he added, “requires data collection as a means to 
continue evaluating the effectiveness of an intervention.” 
 
2001 National Strategy on Suicide Prevention 
 
The 2001 report confirmed and expanded upon the 1999 Surgeon General’s conclusions. 
While the Surgeon General reports addressed mental illness in general as well as suicide, the 2012 
report focused specifically on suicide — defining the problem and presenting prescriptive remedies 
for saving lives. It opened with a clarion call for  “the public health approach to suicide prevention.” 
Recommendations ranged from the sweeping (inpatient and outpatient psychiatric care at all 
community hospitals) to the highly narrow (restricting public access to guns, the most common 
means of suicide. The report also endorsed the theory, advanced in a mounting volume of new 
research, that suicide prevention required the official cooperation of the nation’s news media. The 
reported stated that, “Once individuals in the media have a clear understanding of the implications of 
the ways in which suicide and other issues are depicted, many can see the value in modifying their 
approaches (National Strategy, 2001, p. 107) .The report also echoed the Surgeon General’s finding 
that the campaign against suicide was plagued by a lack of “surveillance” systems that would 
quantify suicide incidence data at the local level: 
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Surveillance systems are key to health planning. They are used to track trends in rates, to 
identify new problems, to provide evidence to support activities and initiatives, to identify 
risk and protective factors, to target high-risk populations for interventions, and to assess the 
impact of prevention efforts.(National Strategy, 2001, p. 30) 
To address the surveillance problem and the need for more detailed incident data at the 
community level, the report called for: 
• Increasing the number of hospitals (including emergency departments) that collect uniform 
and reliable data on suicidal behavior by coding external cause of injuries, utilizing the 
categories included in the International Classification of Diseases. 
• Implementation of a national violent death reporting system that includes suicides and 
collects information not currently available from death certificates. 
• Increasing the number of states that produce annual reports on suicide and suicide attempts, 
integrating data from multiple State data management systems. 
• Increasing the number of nationally representative surveys that include questions on suicidal 
behavior (National Strategy, 2001, pp. 30-31). 
 
The 2001 document also reaffirmed the Surgeon General’s recommendation to replace 
outdated or untested prevention methodologies with newer, evidence-based practices. As an 
example of unacceptable techniques, the 2001 report cited California’s experience with school-
based suicide prevention. The 1987 California legislature passed a law mandating that all school 
districts install formalized suicide intervention and prevention training for staff as well as 
students. The law stipulated that the style and content of such training was to be established by 
the state Department of Education (California State Department of Education School Climate 
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Unit, 1986). The DOE developed a five-day set of one-hour suicide prevention classes, with all 
teaching and lesson plans provided by the DOE. Two years after the law took effect, the state 
DOE dispatched auditors to determine school compliance. The findings of the compliance team 
are chronicled in a report conducted later by the University of California  (Sandoval, London, & 
Rey). The auditing methods included mailed questionnaires sent to school administrators, 
followed up by on-site visits by DOE auditors. Response to the mailed questionnaires found that 
62% of the state’s high schools had complied with the law. The figure was later reduced to 40% 
after the field auditors discovered wide discrepancies between the schools’ answers to the mailed 
questionnaire and the evidence provided during the audit visits. Among the schools that had 
indicated compliance in the mailed survey, 30% were teaching suicide prevention with videotape 
about substance abuse. Fifty-six percent of the schools were found to be using suicide prevention 
materials “that make little, if any, mention of suicide.” (Sandoval et al., 1994, p. 600). The 
schools found not in compliance offered a variety of reasons for not using the suicide prevention 
materials stipulated by the DOE. Thirty-three percent pointed to teacher reluctance, 28% blamed 
time constraints, and 15% did not identify an obstacle. 
The call for standardization of intervention methodologies was accompanied by a call for 
standardization of the language of suicide. Citing the findings of recent research on suicide 
contagion, the 2001 National Strategy offered a set of guidelines for media coverage of suicide,). 
The guidelines stated that, “The way suicide is reported can either CAUSE suicides or PREVENT 
suicide” (National Strategy, 2001, p. 108) . Following are excerpts from the 2001 report’s media 
guidelines: 
• Sensitive articles about suicide can help REDUCE this stigma; but please be 
EXTREMELY careful about how you talk about it and how you cover stories 
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about suicide. 
• Minimize coverage of suicides. Keep the stories relatively brief and do not run 
too many stories. But it is important to run stories! 
• ALWAYS provide suicide prevention information with suicide stories. This is 
CRITICAL. 
• Always provide the national suicide hotline numbers, which are 1-800-SUICIDE 
and 1-800-273-TALK. Consider providing local suicide hotline numbers, too. 
• Emphasize that suicide can be prevented if people get help. 
• Emphasize the number one cause for suicide: The number one cause for suicide 
is untreated depression. 
• Do not hesitate to talk about suicide in stories. But ALWAYS do so in a way that 
provides help, hope, and resources for the suicidal and suicide survivors. 
• Do not begin a television newscast with a suicide story. 
• Do not place suicide stories on the cover of newspapers or magazines. 
• Do not sensationalize suicides. 
• Do not romanticize suicides. 
• Never portray suicides as heroic. 
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• Never say that a suicide “ended pain” or “ended suffering.” Suicide CAUSES 
excruciating pain for suicide survivors. 
• Be careful about describing the methods used. Do not go into great detail about 
the methods, and do not show detailed pictures of the locations where the 
suicides occurred. 
• Do not say suicides occur because of one event. (Suicides rarely occur because 
of one event.) 
• Be careful with the wordings of headlines. Be careful with all of the words that 
are used in the story. 
• DO NOT say “committed suicide.” Say, “died by suicide.”  People commit 
crimes. Suicide is not a crime. 
• Also, do not use the term “successful suicide.” Instead say, “died by suicide.” It is 
extremely insensitive and entirely inaccurate to label a suicide as “successful.” 
• Do not use the word ‘epidemic’ in suicide stories. If suicide rates are rising, use the 
word “rising.”  If they are falling, use the word “falling” (National Strategy, 2001, 
pp. 109-110). 
The 2001 report, including the California experience with school-based programs, led to 
similar investigations around the nation that reached similar conclusions about the nature and 
effectiveness of suicide prevention practices among U.S. schools (Lester, 1990; Shaffer et al., 1990, 
p. 112-113). Many schools, for example, offered prevention programs but only during after-school 
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hours. Early scholarly research had concluded that school-based programs were ineffective unless 
incorporated into the school day with other mandatory curricula (Streiner & Adam, 1987, p. 331; 
Brock & Lazarus, 2012, Chapter 14). Some research argued that uninformed prevention practices 
could backfire and create suicidal thoughts among students (Shaffer & Craft, 1999).  
Authors of the 2001 report summarized their findings as a “comprehensive and integrated 
approach to suicide prevention to be implemented across the country.” The report delivered the 
first set of verified methods for reducing suicide through community-based and school-based 
practices. It also expanded the ring of community institutions — including local news media — 
that must work together in partnership in order to achieve long-lasting reduction in suicide 
deaths. The document also fueled an explosion of research into suicide contagion and the risks 
created by those who ignored the emerging standards and took suicide prevention — and suicide 
news coverage — into their own hands (Gould, Jamieson, & Romer, 2003; Gould et al., 2003). 
 
2003 President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health 
As the 2001 report focused on suicide prevention, the 2003 commission focused on 
general mental health reform. The two reports were twin offspring of the1999 Surgeon 
Genera's "call to action."  The authors of both documents applied "public health" intervention 
methodology to the menace of suicide and mental illness.  
The 2003 Commission listed 19 formal recommendations organized under six 
proposed national goals for mental health, all of which echoed the calls for uniformity and 
standardization that resonated through its predecessor reports of 1999 and 2001. However, 
the 2003 authors engaged the more colorful language of frustration and impatience. It 
described the quality of mental health care in America as "fragmented, disconnected and 
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often inadequate, frustrating the opportunity for recovery."  It characterized existing 
community mental health programs as "a patchwork relic—the result of disjointed reforms 
and policies. Instead of ready access to quality care, the system presents barriers that all too 
often add to the burden of mental illnesses for individuals, their families and our 
communities."  The authors stated, "The time has long passed for yet another piecemeal 
approach." The report demanded a “fundamental transformation” of the nation’s approach to 
mental health care. It defined “fundamental transformation” as one that would “ensure that 
mental health services and supports actively facilitate recovery, and build resilience to face 
life’s challenges.”  The authors said that the current system “simply manages symptoms and 
accepts long-term disability.”  Building upon the mandate of the 1999 Surgeon General 
report, the commission declared that its proposals “can improve the lives of millions of our 
fellow citizens now living with mental illnesses. The benefits will be felt across America in 
families, communities, schools and workplaces.” 
The commission report departed from the 1999 and 2003 reports by painting a picture 
of the future rather a picture of the past. The language was not that of “change” so much as 
the language of starting over, from scratch. The commission framed its recommendations as 
the vision of the future rather the detritus of the past. Its recommendations included increased 
public education regarding mental health, greater involvement of patients and families in care 
decisions, creating individualized care plans, increasing support for employment and 
affordable housing, early screening and treatment, and greater use of evidence-based 
practices. The commission also recommended that the prevailing “fragmentation of services 
for people with mental illness be replaced with one that coordinates all the needs — physical 
and emotional — of mentally ill persons. Throughout the report the authors avoided the voice 
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of the status quo or the perspective of governmental institutions. Instead, recommendations 
were presented as if they were taken from the mouths of the mentally ill and their families 
(now collectively referred to as “consumers). 
Following are excerpts from the text of the 2003 commission report. The authors 
described a future in which all communities will: 
• Give consumers control over their own care. 
• Identify and assist consumers needing employment or income supports. 
• Help consumers receive better help finding employment when necessary. 
• Help consumers find affordable housing. 
• Ensure that essential mental health services are available in correctional 
facilities. 
• Abandon the use of seclusion or restraints to manage the seriously mentally ill. 
• Establish more community-based treatment facilities for children who currently 
are sent to psychiatric treatment centers a significant distance from their 
parents and families. 
• Design a delivery system for the mentally ill in rural or remote areas. 
• Adopt a community policy that local schools should play a larger role in mental 
health care for children. 
• Educate families and school officials about the benefits of early detection and 
screening tactics that intercept emotional disorders at an early age. 
• Develop an alliance with local businesses willing to address the employment 
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crisis among mentally ill persons. 
• Identify and eliminate health care disparities for minorities (2003 Commission, 
2003, p. 38-39). 
 
As did the 1999 and 2001 reports, the 2003 commission established “collaboration” 
and “partnerships” as litmus tests for transformed communities. In using such themes, all 
three reports drew heavily on current consensus that mental illness was a complex malady 
involving multiple co-occurring disorders that required the care and cooperation of multiple 
community services. The existing system, the 2003 report stated, shuttles patients to 
overlapping health care providers, from treatment to treatment, with each provider knowing 
little about what the others have done. 
The 2003 commission demanded a more complex, multidimensional approach that 
rested on the success of partnerships between local institutions that frequently interact with 
the depressed or mentally ill — schools, health care providers, government agencies, law 
enforcement, employers — institutions that often had little history of collaboration. All three 
reports gradually intensified the pressure toward nationally standardized health care models 
delivered through community networks. All three reports drew heavily upon modern 
understanding of mental illness as a tangle of multiple, co-occurring disorders rather than a 
single identifiable malady. Accordingly, it was deemed that treatment and support systems 
had to be similarly complex, a collaboration and cross-collaboration of many moving parts of 
the community. 
A major difference between the 2003 report and the three earlier reports was its 
lukewarm reception among certain consumer groups who questioned the impartiality of a 
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report sponsored by the Bush administration. The 2003 commission endorsed the merits of 
psychotropic medication as an important component of comprehensive mental health care, a 
finding that brought accusations that the commission report had been influenced by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Other mental health consumers and activists supported the 
commission recommendations as codification of state-of-the-art practices. 
 
 
The 2012 National Strategy for Suicide Prevention 
The 2012 report was, officially, an update of the 2001 National Strategy on Suicide 
Prevention. Its primary significance to this research project is its comprehensive indexing of 
current research and methodologies, much of which was still in development at the time of the 
original 2001 suicide prevention report. The report reaffirms the recommendations in the earlier 
reports that communities combat combatting suicide using the public-health principle — an 
elaborate web of community resources that collaborate seamlessly to address the mosaic of 
treatment challenges presented by mental illness and suicidal behavior. The 2012 report also 
repeated the concerns of the earlier reports regarding the risk of suicide contagion and the need 
to enlist the news media as an ally for the purpose of carefully managing the public flow of 
information that might create suicidal thoughts among local youth. 
The 2012 report sorted the existing body of suicide prevention research into four general 
findings, each one identifying the specific needs required for long-term change. They were: 
• The need for streamlined public services that make it easier for the mentally ill and their 
loves ones to retake control over their lives. 
• The need to insert suicide prevention strategies more deeply into the community health 
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care establishment to more fully coordinate the treatment needs of the mentally ill. 
• The active participation of civic leaders willing to shift community resources and 
priorities in order to expand the number of mental health treatment facilities. 
• The significance of real-time surveillance systems in order to track local suicide 
incidence, target new areas of research and aid in the evaluation of new remedies.  
 
 
Within those four categories, the 2012 report listed 10 new objectives being added to the 
2001 strategy for suicide prevention. Those included: 
• Establish effective, sustainable, and collaborative suicide prevention programming at 
the state/territorial, tribal and local levels. 
• Reach policymakers with dedicated communication efforts. 
• Promote effective programs and practices that increase protection from suicide risk. 
• Intervene to reduce suicidal thoughts and behaviors in populations with suicide risk.  
• Provide training to mental health and substance abuse providers on the recognition, 
assessment and management of at-risk behavior and the delivery of effective clinical 
care for people. 
• Promote the adoption of “zero suicides” as an aspirational goal by health care and 
community support systems that provide services and support to defined patient 
populations. 
• Develop and implement protocols for delivering services for individuals with suicide 
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risk in the most collaborative, responsive and least restrictive settings. 
• Encourage health care delivery systems to incorporate suicide prevention and 
appropriate responses to suicide attempts as indicators of continuous quality 
improvement efforts. 
• Promote the safe disclosure of suicidal thoughts and behaviors by all patients. 
• Develop standardized protocols for use within emergency departments based on 
common clinical presentation to allow for more differentiated responses based on risk 
profiles and assessed clinical needs(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2012, p. 92). 
The 2012 report cited the U.S. military as a model for community-based suicide 
intervention. Pressured by Congress and the public to reduce the number of suicides among 
deployed troops, the Pentagon ordered the Army to implement a modern suicide prevention 
and intervention system that used the same principles of SOS: Signs of Suicide. A July 2010 
Pentagon report praised the early results from the Army experiment. (U.S. Department of the 
Army, 2010). Initial success was attributed to a dynamic not present in the civilian population, 
namely, a chain of command with little tolerance for those who fail to carry out orders. Each 
Army suicide was carefully examined to track the rise and fall of the soldier’s military 
experience. Had the solder sought help and, if so, was proper help provided?  Commanding 
officers who failed to provide timely care and treatment were held responsible, military-style. 
The Army’s mandate to reduce military suicides reflected modern scientific consensus about 
suicide as a preventable tragedy.  Its methodology, however, ran counter to cultural 
sensibilities about suicide as a blameless act for which others are not responsible. In military 
parlance, those who fail to prevent a preventable outcome must be held accountable. A New 
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York Times story (“Pentagon Report Places Blame for Suicides”) offered this statement from 
Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, Army vice chief of staff:  “There are instances where a leader’s lack 
of soldier accountability resulted in suicide victims not being found until they had been dead 
for three or four weeks” (Bumiller, 2010, p. 7A). 
 
The significance of the four national reports 
All four studies were presented to the nation as more than just the findings of scholarly 
inquiry. They were presented as standards and policy measures to be implemented by American 
communities, communities that would now have a master blueprint for the implementation of 
evidence-based interventions. Communities would not have to reinvent the wheel of mental 
health reform because they would have a set of instruction manuals that were greater than the 
sum of their parts.   Most significantly, although the first and fourth reports were separated by a 
dozen years, all four reports shared a list of common findings. 
In regards to care for the mentally ill, the four reports shared the following findings: 
• Communities should eliminate disparities between health care services provided for the 
mentally ill and those available to the rest of the population. Such parity should 
include the availability of inpatient and outpatient hospital services. 
• Schools should implement early mental health screening, assessment and referral for all 
children. 
• Local health care providers should use current electronic technology to bette rcoordinate 
the primary care services received by the mentally ill and the treatment provided by 
psychiatrist, psychologists, social workers, etc. The 2003 President’s Commission 
stated that there exists a “chasm” between the treatment the mentally ill are given by 
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family physicians and the specialty treatment they receive from psychiatrists and 
psychologists. 
• Communities and schools should install incident-gathering systems that provide real-
time information about suicide incidence and the needs of the mentally ill. All of the 
reports lamented the substantial time gap between the occurrence of local suicides 
and the availability of information about the deaths. The 2012 National Strategy 
report notes that such real-time monitoring is critical to guard against local clusters or 
outbreaks of suicide. 
• Community fundraisers and civic leadership organizations should extend their charitable 
work to include the creation of integrated/transitional housing for the recovering 
mentally ill. The 2003 President’s Commission found that most American 
communities “lack decent, safe, affordable and integrated housing, which is one of 
the most significant barriers to full participation in community life.” 
• All communities should dispatch independent investigations into the quality of care 
provided to the imprisoned mentally ill. Three of the four reports noted that the rate of 
serious mental illness among those in correctional facilities is nearly four times that 
of the general population. 
In regards to suicide prevention, the four national studies shared numerous 
common findings, calling for: 
• School-based suicide prevention programs that focused on behavioral change and 
coping strategies in the general school population. Combined with skill training and 
social support for at-risk students such programs have beneficial effects on short-term 
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suicidal behavior.  
• Restriction of access to lethal means (e.g., firearms and pharmacological agents) may 
reduce the rate of cause-specific suicide in the general population, but its effect on the 
overall suicide rate was unclear. 
• Psychosocial and pharmacological treatments, such as problem-solving therapy, 
provision of a card for emergency contact, and cognitive behavioral therapy were 
promising in reducing rates of repeated self- harm among suicide attempters. 
• The Suicide Prevention Resource Center’s vast best-practices registry, which, along 
with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has identified evidence-
based programs — especially for schools— since 2002. Among the most popular 
program is Signs of Suicide, a school prevention program developed by private 
behavioral therapy consultants in Boston. The company provides a set OF SOS 
instructional materials for teachers and students at schools of any size, with 
permission to make unlimited copies, plus an instructional DVD. The cost per school:  
$400. 
 
The above four seminal documents contain, collectively, the standards by which scholars 
measure the quality of community-based mental health care and suicide prevention. A reading of all 
four reports provides a clear picture of the mental health care and suicide prevention technology that 
had existed prior to the year 2000 and what experts believe should because of the reports. The 2012 
national strategy report, for example, identifies best practices of the Suicide Prevention Resource 
Center (SPRC) as the nation’s primary library of evidence-based suicide prevention programs for 
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schools.  SPRC’s “best practices registry,” in turn, offers an index of more than 200 evidence-based 
programs and short courses available to schools. Those include SOS: Signs of Suicide, a structured 
two-day program that was among the first programs in the nation to receive endorsement in major 
scholarly journals (Shaffer & Craft, 1999). The SOS staff offers its program and materials to schools 
for a one-time fee of $400, regardless of school size or frequency of use. The four national reports 
also cited the National Association of School Psychologists, publisher of Best Practices in School 
Crisis Prevention and Intervention, a textbook that sets out the professional protocols for responding 
to school tragedies such as a school shooting incident or a student suicide (Brock & Lazarus, 2012). 
The NASP also manages a nationwide network of crisis management experts who can be summoned 
to the scene of any school crisis anywhere in the country to brief local officials on the proper steps to 
take, and decisions to make, in the aftermath of tragedy.  
 
The mass media and mental illness:  Existing research 
The review of literature reveals a large volume of existing content analysis of media 
coverage of mental health issues. Virtually the entire body of such research, however, has 
focused on the narrow issue of suicide contagion. Suicide contagion theory holds that localized 
clusters of suicide can be caused by reckless publicity — usually in the news media. Such 
research has engaged the framework of traditional media impact theory to demonstrate a cause-
effect relationship between media coverage of suicide and actual suicides (Gould, Wallenstein, & 
Kleinman, 1990; Gould, Jamieson, & Romer, 2003; Perry, 2010). The professed goal of such 
research has been to influence how the media write about suicide — how the media should not 
write about suicide.   The pre-eminent authority on suicide contagion is Madelyn Gould, a 
Columbia University professor who specializes in the clinical epidemiology of psychiatric 
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disorders. Dr. Gould’s name is a standard citation in most published materials about suicide 
prevention.  
Most contagion theory research traces the birth of suicide contagion to a spike in suicides 
immediately following the Aug. 6, 1962 death of Hollywood starlet Marilyn Monroe. Monroe’s 
death, and sensational media reports calling it a suicide, reportedly produced a substantial 
number of suicides across the nation in the month following Monroe’s death. Researchers claim 
to have documented 300  “additional” suicides during the 30-day period after Monroe’s death. 
This was interpreted as a 12% increase over the number of expected suicides during that time of 
year based on historical patterns. The research on Monroe’s death stopped short of claiming that 
media publicity caused the additional suicides; the research simply documented the suicides and 
the date of occurrence. Nonetheless, the Monroe publicity elevated suicide contagion from 
nascent, untested theory to official fodder for news media speculation.  By the late 1980s, 
journalists found it impossible to ignore reported “epidemics” of teen suicide.  Among the first, 
and most dramatic, episodes of media intrigue was Teenage Wasteland,  freelance journalist 
Donna Gaines’ investigation into the 1987 suicide clusters in Bergenfield, N.J.  Another was 
Final Exit, a 1992 best-seller that sought public acceptance of human euthanasia and assisted 
suicide for the long-suffering and terminally ill. The book took awareness to another level by 
including detailed instructions on self-asphyxiation, which the author identified as the least 
painful means of suicide. Stack’s research cites data from coroner and law enforcement sources 
indicating that suicides in New York City rose from eight to 33 in the year following the book’s 
release. A copy of Final Exit reportedly was found at the scene of 10 of the suicide scenes. By 
the late 1980s, scientific intrigue about contagion had itself become contagious. A 2003 meta-
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analysis documented 42 suicide contagion research studies between 1991 and 2002 (Stack, 2003, 
p. 1). 
Subsequent contagion investigations added to the list of media guidelines, fueling the 
enthusiasm for reducing suicides by changing how the media write about suicide. Suicide 
research applies media impact theory in reverse. Media impact theory tests the ability of the 
media to alter public policy. Thus, suicide contagion research tests the ability of public 
policymakers (mental health specialists) to alter media coverage.  Columbia University’s 
Madelyn Gould is among the suicide scholars who present suicide contagion not as a theory but 
as epidemiological doctrine. Gould uses the term “media contagion” to describe a cause-effect 
relationship between media coverage and suicide. In a 2003 review of recent contagion research, 
Gould states that, “There is ample evidence from the literature on suicide clusters and the impact 
of the media to support the contention that suicide is contagious (Gould et al., 2003, p. 1269). 
She adds that suicide contagion can be viewed within the theoretical framework “of behavioral 
contagion … in which the same behavior spreads quickly and spontaneously through a group.”  
Gould also cites social learning theory as another paradigm through which suicide contagion 
may be understood, adding that, “most human behavior is learned observationally through 
modeling (Bandura, 1977).”  Gould then advocates for the “preventive effects of appropriate 
reporting of suicide in the news media.” Her 2003 journal article cites other research studies that 
“have identified a decrease in suicides following the implementation of media guidelines.”  The 
2003 journal article concludes that: 
The substantial evidence that vulnerable youth are susceptible to the influence of reporters 
and portrayals of suicide in the mass media underscores the importance of educating media 
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professionals about the potential for suicide imitation and ways to avert it. (Gould et al., 
2003, p. 1276-1277) 
The article concludes with a four-page set of recommendations that encourage the media to 
write about suicide as long as such coverage avoids sensationalism that might cause contagion. 
As an example, the guidelines state that, “the use in headlines of the word ‘suicide’ or referring 
to the cause of death as self-inflicted increases the likelihood of contagion” (Gould et al., 2003, 
p. 1279).  
Gould cites numerous other content analysis projects, including a 2000 examination of 
suicide-related articles in ten major U.S. daily newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune, the 
Dallas Morning News, the Los Angeles Times, USA Today, The New York Times, and the 
Washington Post. The content analysis findings revealed that “the opportunity for suicide 
contagion from stories in major newspapers is quite high” (Gould et al., 2003, p. 1274).  
During the first decade of the new century, contagion theory had won sufficient acceptance 
in scholarly communities that it became the basis for organized communications seeking media 
acceptance of specific guidelines covering stories about suicide. If media coverage causes 
suicide, then researchers were compelled to design ways to change media coverage of suicide. 
Among the media recommendations typical of suicide contagion studies: 
• Avoid reporting the location of a suicide, the method of death, or the contents of suicide 
notes 
• Use appropriate wording when referring to suicide, such as “died by suicide” or 
“completed suicide.”  Do not use expressions such as, “successful suicide attempt.” 
• Avoid terms such as “epidemic” or “skyrocketing” numbers 
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• Avoid reports suggesting that suicide was preceded by a single event, such as a recent 
job loss or firing 
• Seek advice from suicide prevention experts instead of quoting or interviewing police or 
first responders about the causes of suicide 
 
The zeal for such content analysis has been worldwide — all of it devoted to 
documenting or disproving “media contagion” theory. Among these was a 1997 quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of media reports in the Swiss print media (Frey, Michel, & Valach, 1997). 
Quantitative aspects included the length and positioning of the article, presence or absence of a 
picture, size of headline, and frequency of reporting. Qualitative aspects included contents of the 
report, whether articles might serve as a model, and presence of prevention or treatment 
resources. A coding and scoring scheme was devised to generate an “imitation risk score” for 
each newspaper article. Approximately 400 newspapers and magazines were examined. During 
an eight-month period, the Swiss team found 151 articles about suicide in 79 different 
publications. The headline in 47% of the stories was considered to be “sensational.”  In 13% of 
the articles, the headline was judged as “romanticizing the event” or “glorifying” the deceased. 
The research team found “inappropriate” pictures in 20% of the articles. Overall, 44% of the 
articles in the research sample were deemed highly dangerous for their potential to cause 
contagion. The Swiss researchers presented their findings at a national press conference as a 
means to launch guidelines for suicide reporting 
The most recent attempt to alter media polices was a campaign by the California Mental 
Health Services Authority (California Mental Health Services Authority, 2012). The agency 
engaged a team of private education analysts to examine more than 200 news reports involving 
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suicide. The report found a “slight reduction” in what it called “sensational language” in suicide 
stories. However, the authors of the study said there was insufficient evidence to claim any 
cause-effect relationship between actual media content and campaigns urging media compliance 
with the reporting guidelines. The authors concluded that the media’s overall handling of suicide 
was “largely unchanged.” 
The apparent null or default position of such media-directed research is that, lacking 
familiarity with mental health issues and suicide in specific, professional journalists will be 
receptive to protocols supplied by experts outside the journalism profession. A reading of such 
studies reflects no intent at censorship or information control but, rather, an assumption that the 
media’s lack of knowledge about suicide mirrors that of the general public and, hence, journalists 
writing about the subject require expert assistance. 
 
Dissenting Voices 
The literature turns up numerous researchers who have criticized the methodology 
underlying contagion theory (Etzersdorfer & Sonneck, 1998, p. 2). These critics argue that there 
exists little documentation of media-induced suicides and only conjecture esimates about the 
ratio of contagion-related deaths to all reported suicides. Furthermore, critics point out that 
conclusions of media-induced contagion are reached inferentially, with media coverage accepted 
as the default explanation reached without consideration of other plausible variables (Stack, 
2003) — a flawed modus tollens reasoning reminiscent of Bandura’s early theories about media-
induced violence among children. The observation of white swans yields no conclusion about the 
existence of black swans (Joiner, 1999). Others have expressed concern that the relentless pursuit 
of contagion research has diverted attention from the need for broader research into the media’s 
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ability to coverage suicide and mental illness (Pavesi & DiFiorino, 1990). Lastly, experts in 
school-based suicide prevent voice concern that dire warnings about contagion can create anxiety 
among school administrators, and school attorneys, that official enthusiasm for suicide 
prevention initiatives is dampened by official concerns about liability and lawsuits (Poland, 
2010, p. 9-10).  
Gould, considered the world’s leading authority on media contagion, acknowledges the 
doubts about contagion theory while presenting swift rebuttal: 
In contrast to this ample body of literature supportive of the hypothesis that suicides 
dramatized in the media encourage imitation, a few studies have not reported an 
association between media reporting and subsequent suicides (Berman, 1988; Phillips & 
Paight, 1987) or found an association only among adolescent, not adult, suicides (Kessler, 
Downey, Stipp, & Milavsky, 1989). A highly publicized recent study by Mercy et al. 
(2001) found that exposure to media accounts of suicidal behavior and exposure to the 
suicidal behavior in friends or acquaintances were associated with a lower risk of youth 
suicide attempts compared to persons who had not recently attempted suicide. However, 
the interpretability of the findings is limited because (a) the media exposure measure was 
an aggregate of different types of media stories; (b) attempters may have had less 
exposure to media generally (e.g., read fewer books, fewer news- papers, etc.); (c) 
attempters had significantly more proximal stressors, possibly overshadowing their 
recollection of media exposure; (d) the timing of exposure was a 30-day interval, in 
contrast to most other studies, which examined a shorter interval following the exposure; 
and (e) nearly half of the sample was between 25 to 34 years of age, a group not 
particularly sensitive to imitation. 
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Another finding by Mercy et al. (2001) — no effect of parental suicide — also 
was inconsistent with the prevailing research literature. In contrast with this finding, a 
recent study (Cutler, Glaeser, & Norberg, 2001) using data from ADD Health, a 
nationally representative stratified random sample of U.S. high school students, found 
that teenagers who knew friends or family members who had attempted suicide were 
about 3 times more likely to attempt suicide than teens who did not know someone who 
had attempted suicide. There was support for the causality of the association because in 
an examination of two waves of data, teenagers who had not already made a suicide 
attempt in the first wave were more likely to attempt suicide by the second wave if they 
had a friend or relative attempt suicide. Stack’s (2000) review of the literature indicates 
that methodological differences among studies examining the impact of the media are 
strong predictors of differences in the findings. A summary of interactive factors that may 
moderate the impact of media stories, including characteristics of the stories, individual 
reader/viewer attributes, and social context of the stories, is presented by Gould (2001).   
(Gould et al., 2003, p. 1272) 
 
Critics argue that contagion theory has reached the level of mental health doctrine, a 
scholarly status beyond what is justified by its core methodology (Etzersdorfer & Sonneck, 
1998). Such research contends that contagion theory fails to consider events and variables other 
than media coverage, relying instead upon a formula of “If P, then Q.”  Nor, say the critics, does 
contagion theory take into account suicide clusters that occur without being preceded by media 
publicity. Lastly, critics express concern that suicide contagion theory is widely presented to the 
public and the news media as a consensus theory when, in fact, the available literature presents it 
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as a theory contested and debated. A team of Australian researchers recently conducted a 
systematic literature review aimed at critically evaluating the evidence concerning the 
effectiveness of contagion-based media guidelines for reporting on suicide. The authors found 
“significant variability” in media reception to such reporting guidelines, adding that, “journalist 
awareness, use, and opinion of guidelines is generally low. ”In his meta-analysis of 42 contagion 
studies, Stack argues that suicide contagion theory rests on wobbly knees. He states that, “Most 
of the evidence to date for a copycat suicide effect is very indirect and not fully satisfactory. The 
associations are drawn between the presence of a suicide story and a rise in the suicide rate. It 
typically is not known to what extend the people committing suicide are even aware of the 
suicide story”(Stack, 2003, p. 239). Lastly, very recent research suggests that the widespread use 
of electronic social media among young people renders news media coverage irrelevant as a 
contagion trigger (Swanson, 2013). Contagion theory holds that reckless reporting about suicide 
can trigger additional suicides with a given community. However, modern social media outpaces 
the news media in its ability to saturate a community with information — information that may 
be balanced and accurate or false and grossly sensationalized. Swanson’s research argues that 
social media allow uninformed gossip to quickly reach those most vulnerable to  
“contagiousness,” namely, severely depressed adolescents who receive word about the suicide of 
a friend or relative (Swanson, 2013, p. 8). 
Other than contagion research, this literature review unearthed no other content analysis 
regarding media coverage of mental illness and/or suicide. The media guidelines developed by 
contagion research focuses on what the media should not do in writing about suicide. Contagion-
generated research does not address the “why” and “how” and “who’s to blame” considerations 
that typically create the framework for independent media coverage. A recent commentary by 
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Andrew Beaujon, a Poynter Institute media analyst, offers an example of how the media prefer to 
frame such stories — and the frustration among journalists when no framework exists: 
How can we explain shootings if we don’t report on mental illness?  It is easy to find out 
an individual state’s gun laws. It’s far harder to assess a state’s approach to mental health 
issues. Responsibility for that failure lands heavily on the collective shoulders of the U.S. 
news media . . . We might not be able to answer why someone would gun down 
kindergarteners but couldn’t we help our audience figure out what society is doing for the 
mentally ill? (Beaujon, 2012, p.1) 
Media framing:  A research framework 
Social scientists have long sought to examine, explain and predict the interaction between 
media content and public attitudes (Lippmann, 1922; McCombs, 1972). Early theory, for 
instance, contemplated the relationship between violent media content  and violent behavior in 
the population (Bandura, Ross, &Ross, 1963). Later media theoriest reshaped and redefined our 
understanding of when and how the media’s influence is most apparent and significant. Historically,	  media	  impact	  theory	  held	  that	  if	  the	  media	  devote	  time	  and	  space	  to	  the	  economy	  or	  gas	  prices,	  these	  issues	  will	  also	  rise	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  public	  agenda.	  Conversely,	  if	  the	  media	  devote	  scant	  attention	  to	  global	  climate	  change	  or	  youth	  suicide,	  each	  will	  hold	  a	  lower	  station	  on	  the	  public	  dance	  card,	  if	  they	  join	  the	  dance	  at	  all.	  Over	  time,	  media	  impact	  theory	  was	  shaped	  and	  modified	  by	  fresh	  research	  suggesting	  that	  the	  media	  did	  not	  influence	  how	  people	  think	  so	  much	  as	  what	  people	  think	  about	  (Cohen,	  1963).	  The	  co-­‐founders	  of	  agenda	  setting	  theory	  (McCombs,	  1972;Lippmann,	  1922)	  created	  plausible	  explanations	  for	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  news	  to	  influence	  the	  number	  and	  variety	  of	  issues	  that	  shape	  public	  policy	  —	  the	  issues	  that	  are	  added	  to	  and	  removed	  from	  
  
 
34 
 
the	  public’s	  agenda.	  By elevating certain issues over others, the media have the ability to 
influencehow voters think, behave and vote, which is to say the media have the ability to alter 
how policies and policy makers are viewed by the public (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990).  
Additional research led to the thinking that certain media influence certain people on 
certain issues (Lang and Lang, 1966). The nature of the relationship between media coverage and 
public policy eventually evolved into multi-purpose apparatus of specialized tools suitable to a 
wide variety of media-public interactions, such as presidential elections, advertising, and health 
care (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The new utensils of media impact theory required new names 
that more accurately described their purpose. The modern toolbox of media impact theories 
became known as “agenda setting” or “agenda building.”  Among most useful devices for 
understanding media impact is a precision-alignment device known as “framing.”  Tankard 
defined a story’s frame as “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context 
and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” 
(Severin & Tankard, 2001, p. 110-111). Framing theory offers the best available perch from 
which to witness, if not fully explain, the influence of the news media on public understanding of 
mental illness and suicide as public health threats. Media framing can be a conscious 
manipulation caused by media bias. The frame also may be indirectly determined by the quality 
and completeness of information provided to the media or the quality and completeness of 
journalistic research (Zucker, 1978; McCombs, 1994; Terkildsen & Schnell, 1997). 
Those who engage agenda setting and framing theory must contend with the risk of 
misperceived correlations (Classsen, 2013). Does media framing determine the public agenda 
setting, or vice-versa? What forces might produce a news media agenda that gives diminished 
significance to a health risk that health experts consider a major crisis? The trajectory of media 
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framing can be more clearly witnessed through the lens of yet another agenda setting offspring 
— issue obtrusiveness. The ability of media framing to influence the public agenda is more 
likely with issues unfamiliar to the public (Zucker, 1978; Severin & Tankard, 2001). Unfamiliar 
issues are unobtrusive issues, that is, issues that do not impact one’s everyday life, even if it only 
seems that way. Many people are unconcerned about global climate changes, for example, which 
may leave them uninformed on the topic and, thus, more likely to be influenced by the mass 
media. High gas prices, on the other hand, are an obtrusive issue, one that affects everyday life. 
The typical consumer may read news stories about the explanation for high gas prices but his 
personal interest or agitation exists regardless of how much newsworthiness the media attach to 
the issue (Wanta, 1997; Wimmer, 2009). Similarly, those with responsibility for providing and 
managing local public services will be more sensitive to media coverage of health issues than 
will the average person. Policymakers have much at stake in the media framing of public issues, 
which motivates them to actively seek, attend and process media messages. (Yanovitkzky, 2002). 
The reputation and careers of public officials can be altered not only by the media’s 
characterization of issues but also by the information used by journalists — or provided to them 
— for evaluating the performance of public officials (McCombs, 1994; Zucker, 1978).  
The news media, of course, can choose whether or not to let their coverage agenda be 
influenced by pressure groups and special interests. Journalists can decline to engage in 
“reactive” coverage and, instead, use their own shovels to unearth heretofore-ignored issues. 
Such independent behavior is in line with the journalism profession’s vow to remain separate and 
apart from outside influence, functioning as an independent influence on public policy ("SPJ 
Code," 2013).Editors and reporters engage in agenda building and issue framing with every 
decision made about which issues are within reach of available manpower. The choices are 
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rarely between covering and not covering, but, rather, between informed, in-depth stories 
(sometimes known as “thematic”) and that which is merely anecdotal and episodic in nature 
(Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). Such decisions by the news media are made under the same 
restraints of familiarity and unfamiliarity —obtrusiveness and unobtrusiveness — that affect the 
public agenda (Terkildsen & Schnell, 1997). Familiar issues and familiar sources can shape the 
media’s framing of mental health and suicide as public health issues. Conversely, how the media 
frames mental health and suicide prevention can alter the media’s familiarity — or its perceived 
familiarity with such issues.  
This interaction— between media framing of mental health stories and the media’s 
familiarity with mental health issues — has not gone unnoticed in journalism circles. In March 
2013, the Associated Press offered some journalistic guidance on coverage of mental health by 
announcing what it called a “long-overdue” addition to the AP Stylebook  — the glossary of 
grammatical standards conventions for print journalists — regarding stories about mental illness 
and suicide. In explaining the new guidelines, a senior Associated Press official stated that, “It is 
the right time to address how journalists handle questions of mental illness in coverage. This 
isn’t only a question of which words one uses to describe a person’s illness. There are important 
journalistic questions, too” (Carroll, 2013, p.1). At this writing, the new standards were available 
online in draft form and were expected in print editions by summer 2013. 
The new AP guidelines for reporters and editors include: 
• Do not describe an individual as mentally ill unless it is clearly pertinent to a story and 
the diagnosis is properly sourced.  
• When used, identify the source for the diagnosis. Seek firsthand knowledge; ask how the 
source knows. Don’t rely on hearsay or speculate on a diagnosis. Specify the time 
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frame for the diagnosis and ask about treatment. A person’s condition can change 
over time, so a diagnosis of mental illness might not apply anymore. Avoid 
anonymous sources. On-the-record sources can be family members, mental health 
professionals, medical authorities, law enforcement officials and court records. Be 
sure they have accurate information to make the diagnosis. Provide examples of 
symptoms. 
• Mental illness is a general condition. Specific disorders are types of mental illness and 
should be used whenever possible: He was diagnosed with schizophrenia, according 
to court documents. She was diagnosed with anorexia, according to her parents. He 
was treated for depression. 
• Do not use derogatory terms, such as insane, crazy/crazed, nuts or deranged, unless 
they are part of a quotation that is essential to the story.  
• Do not assume that mental illness is a factor in a violent crime, and verify statements to 
that effect. A past history of mental illness is not necessarily a reliable indicator. 
Studies have shown that the vast majority of people with mental illness are not 
violent, and experts say most people who are violent do not suffer from mental 
illness.  
• Avoid unsubstantiated statements by witnesses or first responders attributing violence to 
mental illness. A first responder often is quoted as saying, without direct knowledge, 
that a crime was committed by a person with a “history of mental illness.” Such 
comments should always be attributed to someone who has knowledge of the 
person’s history and can authoritatively speak to its relevance to the incident.  
  
 
38 
 
• Avoid descriptions that connote pity, such as afflicted with, suffers from or victim of. 
Rather, he has obsessive-compulsive disorder.  
• Double-check specific symptoms and diagnoses. Avoid interpreting behavior common 
to many people as symptoms of mental illness. Sadness, anger, exuberance and the 
occasional desire to be alone are normal emotions experienced by people who have 
mental illness as well as those who don’t.  
• Wherever possible, rely on people with mental illness to talk about their own diagnoses  
• Avoid using mental health terms to describe non-health issues. Don’t say that an awards 
show, for example, was schizophrenic.  
• Use the term mental or psychiatric hospital, not asylum (Carrroll, 2013, p. 2-3). 
It is important to note that the AP Stylebook is news journalism’s pocket dictionary, a 
professional guide to language that is both proper and accurate. It does not contain 
recommendations on which issues the media should cover or how to structure long-term 
investigation of mental health and suicide issues. Itzhak Yanovitsky, Rutgers University health 
communications scholar, suggests that the media’s ability to shape public policy often is 
underestimated by research that focuses on short-term behavior and short-term results 
(Yanovitzky, 2002).   In yet one more demonstration of the flexibility of modern agenda setting 
theory, Yanovitsky sought to chart a timeline between initial media attention and eventual social 
change. Put another way, Yanovitsky’s findings demonstrated the difference between social 
movements that gain mere “attention” and those that bring about permanent policy change   
Long-term change, he concluded, requires long-term media “attention” to a particular issue. 
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Those forces patient enough to develop media trust and credibility over a long period of time are 
most likely to shape the media’s eventual framing of the issues involved. 
Yanovitsky charted the history of America’s grassroots campaign against drunk driving 
from the late 1970s to the 1990s. Alongside the timeline of events he graphed the trajectory of 
media attention to the issue. The time difference between media attention and final action, he 
concluded, represented the news media’s learning curve — the time required for consumer safety 
activists to reach dominance as the media’s primary source of trusted information. Though 
research into drunk driving as a public health issue had begun a decade earlier, it had received 
little media coverage until the beginning of the 1980s and the emergency of consumer advocates 
such as Ralph Nader and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. By the end of the 1980s, passenger 
cars had lost their reputation as the ticket to entertainment and the good life. Consumer groups 
successfully redescribed the automobile as a deadly, killing machine. Despite the auto industry’s 
efforts to reverse this framing, the consumer activists had carried the day. By winning the race 
for media attention and credibility, the consumerists were able to shape the media’s framing of 
the health and safety issues involved. Shouts of protest from automakers became helpless 
whimpers once the news media accepted drunk driving and dangerous cars as two pictures 
requiring a single frame, refusing to let the industry distance themselves from the carnage caused 
by drunk drivers media enabling consumer activists to referee the line between available 
information and existing information.  Attention drawn, Yanovitsky argues, is short-lived and 
produces short-term results.  Attention captured produces long-term change. The Naderites’ 
influence over public policy, Yanovitsky argues, began long before it was noticed: nearly 20 
years worth of grassroots lobbying, media briefings, expert testimony, and Ralph Nader press 
conferences. Short-term results included the nation’s first laws mandating seat belts and air bags. 
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As news media attention began shifting to other issues during 1990s, Yanovitsky notes, public 
officials and policy makers had been conditioned to consider the ultimate prize: fundamental, 
permanent reduction in human suffering. Such change included not only the redesign of 
passenger vehicles but also the redesign of auto advertising that now touted safety over speed. 
From 1970 to 1990, auto fatalities dropped from 52,000 to 42,000. The 2011 death toll was 
32,300 — the lowest in 62 years. The biographies of countless automakers and politicians 
contained documented credit for the regulatory and engineering changes that so dramatically 
reduced the loss of life from car accidents. Less documented, Yanovitsky argues, was the 
contribution of those who understood the potential for an informed news media to make such 
change possible.  
In reviewing the ability of special interests to control media framing, Yanovitsky is 
careful to distinguish “public attention” from public “awareness.”  He defines public attention as 
the end result of sustained attention to a clearly visible problem for which there are clearly 
visible solutions. He defines “awareness” as the end result of public attention to a dimly 
understood problem for which there are no apparent solutions: 
 The impact of media attention on policy is a function of the extent to which media 
framing of public problems serves policymakers’ interests or the special interests they 
represent. If media frames of problems put policy makers in uncomfortable positions, 
they are likely to respond more slowly to a problem by sticking to organizational and 
institutional routines (e.g., convening a panel or a committee to study the issue). 
(Yanovitsky, p. 445) 
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Yanovitsky’s findings about the arc of auto safety reform in the late 1900s — the long span 
of media attention required to produce long-term policy change — offers yet another example of 
how traditional media impact theory has been molded and modeled over time to meet the needs 
of specialized research.  
Literature Review: A Summary 
For the media and anyone else trying to understand the public health issues presented 
by mental illness and suicide, the sources identified in this review provide an evaluative tool 
greater than the sum of its parts. The seminal reports of the past two decades have been 
consistently presented by their authors not as a series of disparate findings but rather, as a 
vision for the future — a bundled set of standards for reducing mental illness and suicide. 
One need not agree with the vision in order to acknowledge that the vision exists.  
While available research offers a detailed blueprint for addressing mental illness, no 
similar blueprint addresses the needs of journalists trying to cover such a complex public 
health issue. Existing research about the media and mental illness focuses solely on suicide 
contagion. Such research has triggered repeated attempts at advising the news media about 
the dangers of writing about suicide. These research projects can be viewed as a blueprint 
for what not to write and how not to cover mental illness and suicide. Such cautionary 
warnings, however, do not offer guidance on how journalists ought to address mental illness 
and suicide — within what framework journalists should address the problem and its 
solutions. The literature review for this project uncovered no attempts at synthesizing the 
history, facts, consensus documents, and expert sources into a checklist or litmus tests that 
journalists might use to assess the nation’s progress, or lack of progress, against mental 
illness and suicide. Nor did the inspection of existing literature produce any research 
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regarding those community agencies and institutions considered accountable for the quality 
of mental health care and suicide prevention systems. Absent such research, a conclusion 
was made that the news media possess no standard guidelines or litmus tests for sorting out 
what currently exists and what should exist in community health care and suicide 
prevention.   This does not imply that the news media lack the ability to make such 
distinctions but, rather, that there is no coherent presentation of the criteria needed to make 
such distinctions.  
This finding makes a compelling argument for six research questions, the answers to 
which will address the overall question regarding the news media’s familiarity. 
 
 
 
Research Questions 
RQ1: Does media coverage of mental health and/or suicide make any reference to any of the 
four national consensus reports that have established the criteria for community mental health 
reform and suicide prevention? 
Many scholars and scholarly institutions have investigated mental illness, its symptoms 
and treatments. However, only a limited number of research projects have produced 
widespread agreement on the standards and baseline requirements for community-based 
systems and interventions. The most frequently acknowledged source documents for 
such standards are the 1999 Surgeon General’s Call To Action, the 2001 National 
Strategy on Suicide Prevention, the 2003 President’s New Freedom Commission on 
Mental Health and, the 2012 National Strategy for Suicide Prevention. 
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RQ2:  Do journalists reporting on mental health or suicide seek out the recognized primary 
sources of information regarding general community-based interventions? 
Though there exist many sources of scholarly and clinical standards for treating mental 
illness or suicidality, the most commonly cited blueprint for community-wide action are 
found in the materials developed for schools. Because local quality of life is often 
considered synonymous with quality of local schools, great efficacy inures to the 
recommendations of school boards and school administrators. The literature abounds 
with agreement regarding the importance of making schools a central figure, if not the 
starting point, in community initiatives regarding mental health and suicide prevention 
(Mowbray & Holter, 2002, Chapter 3; Avery, 2013, p. 17-20). 
 
RQ3:  Do journalists writing about mental illness and suicide among young persons seek out the 
primary source of standards developed for schools and universities?  
There is unanimity in the literature that the intervention of choice for all public health 
issues involves the trinity of early screening, early detection, and early treatment. A 
wide body of research confirms that most mental illnesses and suicidal thought can be 
traced to symptoms that were present, but not diagnosed, as early as third or fourth 
grade. The literature is consistent in the recommendation that communities implement 
one unified approach to mental health intervention rather than attempt public 
cooperation with multiple systems. The four nationwide consensus reports present the 
goals and objectives of mental health care reform. The most widely endorsed set of 
actual tactics, however, are found in the “best practices” textbooks published by the 
National Association of School Psychologists.    
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RQ4:  Does media coverage of mental health and/or suicide cite the need for community 
surveillance/tracking as frequently cited in the nationwide studies? 
The mental health source documents and research reports were unanimous in their 
demand for better data at the community level regarding the local incidence of suicide 
and the local population of persons needing mental health treatment. 
RQ5: Do media reports about suicide mention "contagion" or "suicide contagion" (sometimes 
referred to as “copycat suicide”) as a health threat created by media coverage of suicide? 
This data point addresses media familiarity with an issue that can significantly impact 
community response to the threat of suicide. Fourteen years after the U.S. Surgeon 
General’s report declaring suicide a major public health issue (Satcher, 1999), neither 
the U.S. Public Health Service (www.usphs.gov) nor the National Association of 
Community Health Centers (www.nachc.com )nor the National Council for Community 
Behavioral Healthcare Services (www.thenationalcouncil.org) recognizes suicide 
tracking or contagion monitoring as an obligation of local public health agencies. 
Nonetheless, suicide contagion theory has played a fundamental role in public 
understanding of suicide. It also has driven the bulk of scholarly research regarding 
media coverage. The review of contagion literature revealed no consensus formula for 
identifying suicide contagion or declaring a state of contagion. Neither the U.S. Public 
Health Service nor the Department of Health and Human Services tracks local suicide 
outbreaks; neither agency establishes public health norms for the definition of contagion. 
Most of what is known about contagion, and how to recognize it, is found in Gould’s 
work and that of Dr. Scott Poland of the National Association of School Psychologists. 
A review of the research on suicide contagion finds consensus on the theory of 
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contagion and its threat to public health. The research contains no officially endorsed 
methodology for identifying contagion or declaring a condition of contagion. Gould’s 
most recent research (Gould et al., 2010) defines suicide contagion as: 
1.a localized outbreak of suicide greater than historical norms 
2. in a single community 
3. during any three-month period  
 
An example: Community USA has never had more than two youth suicides in any given month 
over the past 20 years, with “youth” defined as ages 15-24. During mid-August, administrators at 
the Community USA School District discover that eight students have died by suicide in the first 
two weeks of August. If school officials were to seek the counsel of Dr. Gould or Dr. Poland, 
both experts would declare that a state of suicide contagion exists in Community USA and 
prescribe a specific set of school and community intervention steps. The literature review yielded 
no clarity on the definition of “community” for the purposes of computing gathering contagion 
data. 
“Suicide contagion” is an academic expression used by mental health scholars; no such 
term or mortality classification is found in the nation’s uniform reporting systems for crime, 
mortality, and injury (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2012). The tracking or report of 
suicide contagion, or apparent contagion, is not included among the standard reporting 
obligations of state and local health agencies charged with tracking public health threats and 
communicable disease. A close examination of contagion research literature suggests there are 
two ways in which U.S. communities may be alerted to a current or past outbreak of suicide 
matching the scholarly criteria for contagion. Such notice can be delivered by:  
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• local health, school, or law enforcement officials who believe the community’s 
suicide incidence has suddenly increased. Such community declarations rarely use 
the technical term “contagion” but, rather, draw public and media attention to 
what officials believe to be a current spike in suicides.  
• state mortality data reports that document past community history of suicide 
incidence. Suicide is accepted as the cause of death based solely on entries made 
on death certificates by local coroners or medical examiners. Death certificates 
are submitted to a state health agency that tracks mortality and injury data. All 
such data is later compiled into annual “vital statistics” reports that are subsequent 
released to the media and posted online. Such vital statistics summaries report 
mortality incident only at the county and state level. The time lag between a 
coroner-confirmed suicide and the inclusion of that suicide in a state vital 
statistics report is typically 12 to 18 months. Thus, most outbreaks of suicide 
contagion are not known or report in real time but, rather, are identified much 
later by researchers who search state mortality reports for indications of recent 
“contagion” outbreaks. Unless communities install their own suicide surveillance 
systems, the gathering and release of community-level suicide incident data is left 
to the discretion of local officials.  
 
RQ6:  In stories that discuss suicide contagion theory, do the media seek out recognized national 
experts on this topic or do the media rely upon explanations from persons of unknown expertise? 
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As with RQ5, this data point addresses the media’s familiarity with a significant mental 
health issue that frequently arises in public reports about mental illness and suicide. 
Educating the public and media about suicide contagion requires considerable scholarly 
expertise. Misinterpretations and misunderstandings about contagion can result in 
community policies and decisions not intended or substantiated by contagion research 
(Poland, Lieberman, & Cowan, 2006, p. 2). Epidemiological science addresses 
communicable disease — mumps, measles, and influenza. “Contagious” is the lay 
expression for the behavior of communicable disease. Suicide contagion theory involves 
an inversion of epidemiological language. Suicide is not a disease; it is an action. The 
suicidal act is the fatal outcome of an untreated disease. The National Institute of Mental 
Health estimates that 90% or more of all suicide victims died after prolonged affliction 
with one or more co-occurring mental illnesses as listed in the national DSM-IV 
psychiatric diagnostic manual ("NIMH," 2013, p. 1). Mental illnesses can be inherited 
but it is not contagious. Relying on traditional principles of behavior theory, suicide 
contagion holds that information about the suicides of others can compel other suicidal 
persons to do likewise. Suicide scholars can help the media and public distinguish the 
“contagiousness” of suicide from the contagiousness of familiar communicable disease. 
Explanations offered by non-experts can lead to misinterpretations by the general public 
as well as public officials (Bertolote, 2004, p. 149). Whether accurately or inaccurately 
interpreted, warnings about suicide contagion are today deeply established in the public 
health and public education fields as well as the rapidly emerging field of crisis 
communication and crisis management (Joiner, 2005, p. 60). The news media regularly 
receive recommendations and warnings from suicide experts about how to cover suicide 
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without triggering contagion. A casual review of media reports on youth suicide turns up 
numerous reports of emotionally charged standoffs involving school administrators’ 
interpretation of contagion theory and the clamor of grieving students seeking to 
preserve the memory of a fallen classmate (Mach, 2012).Appendix B. 
  
 
49 
 
 
Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
Content analysis methodology is well suited for an examination of media coverage. It 
allows both qualitative and quantitative techniques to measure authorship, authenticity, meaning, 
and audience impact (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, & Bracken, 2002, p. 587). Content analysis of a 
large body of information can lead to reliable conclusions about the impact of media coverage on 
public policy. In the case of mental health coverage, content analysis is particularly useful tool 
for analyzing media coverage of complicated issues that has vexed society for many generations. 
To examine media familiarity of mental illness and suicide, a coding sheet was 
constructed by converting six research questions into 19 specific text strings or textual “data 
points.”  Each of the 19 points represents a specific piece of information drawn from the 
literature and deemed essential for a comparison between the quality of mental health care and 
suicide interventions that exist today and the systems that should exist according to national 
standards. Sixteen of the 19 data points indicated journalist familiarity with a primary source 
document (i.e., one of the four nationwide reports) or a primary source individual — experts 
considered the nation’s leading scholars on mental health and suicide. Two data points indicated 
familiarity with the issue of suicide contagion. One data point represented familiarity with the 
surveillance data required for community intervention, as noted in the national consensus reports.   
For example, one data point sought evidence of familiarity with the 2012 National 
Strategy for Suicide Prevention and its recommendations. Coders searched each newspaper 
article for any specific mention of the 2012 report.   Finding such a reference, the coder checked 
the “Yes” box next to 2012 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION on the 
code sheet. Finding no such reference, the coder checked the “No” box. 
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Data points for each research question were drawn from the major source documents 
found in the review of literature. Care was taken to identify the most significant community 
recommendations/standards found in all four of the national consensus reports. Though the 
consensus reports spanned a period of nearly 13 years (1999, 2001, 2003, 2012) a number of 
significant recommendations were common to all four reports. In addition, suicide contagion 
theory played a central role in the nation’s history of mental health research as well as history of 
research into media coverage of mental health. Accordingly, references to contagion theory were 
deemed essential to any measurement of media familiarity. Lastly, the names of three leading 
scholars were added to the code sheet in order to measure media familiarity with experts 
considered credible sources for media interviews. There are literally scores of mental health and 
suicide experts around the globe, who could potentially provide current and consistent 
information about national standards on such issues. The three individuals listed on the code 
sheet were chosen based on (a) the frequency with which their names appeared in the literature 
search, (b) the frequency with which their names have previously appeared in media coverage 
dating back to the early 1990s. Although media samples were only drawn from the past two 
years, a much longer time is typically required for any individual or expert to build a reputation 
as a reliable and available source for the news media. As assumption was made that mental 
health experts sought out by journalists during the 2000 -2012 period would likely include 
experts utilized by journalists prior to that time period.  
In constructing the research question data points, great care was taken to heed the body of 
instructional and scholarly literature regarding intercodal reliability in research that relies upon 
content analysis. Common cautions found in such readings include the important of creating text 
strings or “data points” that are sufficiently specific so as to reduce or eliminate ambiguity or 
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coder misinterpretation. Achieving such interpretive convergence among coders requires that all 
coders receive clear and consistent instruction (Hruschka, Schwartz, St. John, Jenkins, & Carey, 
2004, p. 320-323).  Drawing upon the literature, a set of data points was constructed to provide 
answers to the Research Questions. That is, the code sheet raters searched each newspaper article 
for any mention of these data points. 
Content analysis coding instrument 
Following are the data points established for each Research Question: 
Research Question #1 
Does the sample mention any of the four (4) national consensus reports that have 
established the criteria for community mental health reform and suicide prevention?   
• The 1999 U.S. Surgeon General’s Call To Action  [Yes/No] 
• The 2001 National Strategy on Suicide Prevention  [Yes/No] 
• The 2003 New Freedom Commission on Mental Health [Yes/No] 
• The 2012 National Strategy on Suicide Prevention [Yes/No] 
 
Research Question #2 
Does the sample mention or quote any of the organizations and experts considered 
primary sources of information about the essential components of community mental health 
reform and suicide prevention? 
• The National Association of School Psychologists (NASP). For nearly two decades the 
NASP’s “best practice” textbooks have been considered the gold standard for crisis 
intervention and postvention involving schools and students. [Yes/No] 
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• The Suicide Prevention Resource Center. SPRC is the world’s largest publisher and 
repository for evidence-based community programs designed to reduce suicide and 
suicide attempts. [Yes/No] 
• Scott Poland, Ed.D., Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. [Yes/No] 
• Stephen E. Brock, Ph.D., California State University, Sacramento, Calif. [Yes/No] 
Poland and Brock are the nation’s leading experts, academicians, and crisis management 
consultants for school-based mental health care and suicide prevention. The two are credited as 
the founding co-authors of the NASP’s “best practice” textbooks series, which is required study 
for school psychologists and counselors as well as school administrators. The two are widely 
published and quoted on such issues as school crisis response, youth violence, suicide 
intervention, self-injury, school safety, threat assessment, parenting, and the delivery of 
psychological services in schools.  The two have lectured and written extensively on these 
subjects and appeared on all major television network news programs. They have presented 
thousands of workshops in every state and numerous foreign countries.  Poland is a founding 
member of the National Emergency Assistance Team for the National Association of School 
Psychologists and serves as the Prevention Director for the American Association of 
Suicidology.  Poland also has led multiple national crisis teams following numerous school 
shootings and suicides and has assisted schools and communities after major terrorism acts. Both 
are past presidents of the National Association of School Psychologists. 
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Research Question #3 
Does the sample mention or cite any of the following as sources or experts regarding 
school-based mental health issues?  
• The Suicide Prevention Resource Center [Yes/No] 
• The National Association of School Psychologists [Yes/No] 
• Scott Poland, Ed.D., Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. [Yes/No] 
• Stephen E. Brock, Ph.D., California [Yes/No] 
It is not by chance that the data points for RQ3 are identical to those for RQ2. The goals 
and objectives of community-based intervention and school-based interventions are often similar 
and frequently identical (2003 Commission, 2003, p. 64-65). Community-based prevention 
efforts typically begin with, and intersect with, prevention programs launched in local school 
systems. The names and organizations in these four data points are readily available, primary 
sources for journalists who write about mental illness and suicide from the perspective of 
schools, the general community, or both. 
 
Research Question #4 
Does the sample mention the need for, or significance of, local incidence data as a 
prerequisite for community intervention systems? [Yes/No] 
The importance of a local surveillance system is mentioned in many source documents 
about community-based mental health reform. It is specifically cited in the U.S. Surgeon 
General’s Call To Action (1999); The National Strategy on Suicide Prevention (2001); and, The 
President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health (2003) 
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Research Question #5 
Does the media sample mention “contagion” or the risk of “copycat” suicides?  
[Yes/No] 
The recent avalanche of research into media coverage of suicide requires journalistic 
familiarity with suicide contagion theory — what contagion is and what it is not. The theory 
holds that too much publicity or coverage about suicide can trigger localized outbreaks or 
clusters of suicide. Concerns about contagion, in turn, have weighed heavily on deliberations 
among school administrators and school attorneys about the dangers of classroom instruction 
regarding suicide prevention (Lester, 1990, p. 40-42; Poland, Lieberman, & Cowan, 2006)).    
 This Research Question searches for textual evidence that stories about suicide reflect an 
understanding of contagion theory, what it is and what it is not. 
 
Research Question #6 
What sources are cited in media coverage about the risks of suicide contagion?   
• Local sources only   [Yes/No] 
• Scott Poland, Ph.D. (national expert)   [Yes/No] 
• Madelyn Gould, Ph.D., Columbia University (national expert) 
• Others identified as scholarly experts   [Yes/No] 
There are many medical and scientific experts that can provide information about suicide 
contagion. Dr. Gould and Dr. Poland are the experts most frequently cited in contagion research 
reports as well as news media reports. Dr. Gould is considered the nation’s leading scholar and 
researcher on contagion theory; Dr. Poland is the leading national expert on how contagion 
concerns should shape the community/school response to suicide among local youth. There also 
is considerable consensus in the national source documents that contagion theory is sufficiently 
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complex, and widely misinterpreted, that media explanations by national experts may be 
significantly different from the explanations and definitions offered by a local school principal or 
minister (Tatum, Canetto, & Slater, 2010, p. 390-392). 
Sample search criteria 
The media sample for this content analysis was taken from the LexisNexis database of 
mental health-related stories published in both large newspapers and small newspapers over a 
two-year period, 2010-2012. Samples were pulled randomly from five LexisNexis content 
categories:  mental illness, mental health, suicide, teen suicide, and suicide prevention. The 
LexisNexis sorts print media stories into  “major” or “small town” newspapers, based upon 
audited circulation data published in the annual Editor & Publisher Year Book. 
Searching both large and small newspapers for stories in the five subject categories 
(mental illness, mental health, suicide, teen suicide, suicide prevention) produced a total 
population of more than 6,300 possible print media articles, as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
Population of Qualified Media Samples 
 Major 
newspapers 
Small 
Newspapers 
Mental health 999 323 
Mental illness 1,000 157 
Suicide 1,009 180 
Teen suicide 2,808 25 
Suicide prevention 120 21 
Total qualifying 
samples 
5,936 706 
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From the total qualifying population of 6,642 print media articles, 200 were randomly selected 
for coding using the19 data points generated by the six research questions. A coding sheet was 
constructed to sort the 200-story sample according to newspaper size as well as type of story. 
Story type was broken into three groupings: 
• Episodic — “Hard news” stories, which are generally given immediate but superficial 
attention and typically do not involve in-depth or investigative reporting. Examples 
would include stories that report recent statistical trends in mental illness or suicide, or 
the declaration of a local “awareness week.” 
• Thematic — In-depth feature stories or investigative stories that typically require 
lengthy preparation by the author. Examples might include a feature story, or series of 
stories, examining the overall quality of mental health care in a community. Such 
stories typically seek out mental health scholars and experts to address “why” and 
“how” questions about trends in mental illness or suicide. 
• Editorial Commentary — Commentaries, typically found on newspaper editorial and 
“op-ed” pages. These may by unsigned institutional editorials that represent an official 
viewpoint of the newspaper's management or bylined commentaries that represent the 
opinion of an identified editorial writer or columnist. 
Raters indicated little difficulty in coding articles by story type. All were student 
journalists. All were tutored by the author to understand the distinction between “hard news” 
(episodic), in-depth or investigative reporting (thematic), and editorial commentary. Additionally 
all news articles from LexisNexis lists the article’s word count as well as its headline, which 
gives the user a rough indication of the story type when choosing random samples. For example, 
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an article of 1,000 or more words is more likely to be a thematic story than an article of 400 
words or less. 
The training of coders (student journalists) involved an in-depth review of media story 
types in order to ensure that all coders had the same understanding of the three story types (see 
Appendices B, C and D for examples of samples used). A St. Louis story about funding for local 
mental health services and a Topeka story about a murder-suicide were used as examples of 
episodic coverage. A New York Times magazine article about suicide and a Cincinnati story 
about how teenagers can save the lives of suicidal friends were used as examples of thematic or 
in-depth coverage. A commentary from a Lawrence, Mass., newspaper was among the examples 
used to demonstrate editorial samples. 
The RQ data points along with the search criteria for newspaper size and story type led to 
the design of a one-page coding instrument (Appendix A).  Each code sheet contained the 
coder’s name and date, the newspaper name, the story headline, and Yes/No checkboxes to 
indicate whether the article was pulled from the LexisNexis list of “major” newspapers or the 
LexisNexis list of “small town” papers. The coder’s initials also were recorded directly onto each 
newspaper sample for later reference if needed. Before proceeding to coding the targeted sample 
of stories, the conducing instrumented was tested for coding reliability and agreement.  
Testing the coding instrument 
SPSS Statistics was the software was used to measure intracodal and intercodal 
agreement. Such analysis affirms (or rejects) a necessary measure of reliability and agreement in 
how each rater applies and interprets the code sheet criteria. All coding criteria (data points) in 
agreement are divided by the total number of criteria. The resulting figure is a range from 0 to 
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1.00, with the larger values indicating better reliability. Generally, an agreement of .70 is 
considered acceptable; .80 is considered very good. 
Coding tests were conducted using a set of news articles taken from both large and small 
newspapers. Intercodal testing was conducted using a group of volunteers (Kansas State 
University journalism students). Two teams of five raters each were given samples to code. In 
one test, all 10 coders were given the same article to code. In the second test, Team 1 members 
coded one article while Team 2 members coded a different article. The project author also coded 
the same articles given to the two teams. All tests, by the coding teams and the project author, 
produced an intercodal agreement of .9 or higher across all Research Questions.   The code sheet 
and search criteria were then used to create a research sample of 200 newspaper articles. All 200 
code sheets were gathered and the results entered into an SPSS Statistics file. The SPSS file was 
formatted according to the data variables and field headings of the coding instrument. All coding 
data was entered by the author and then re-checked by a member of the volunteer coding team. 
Description of the coded sample 
The code sheet, along with the search criteria regarding newspaper size and story content, 
produced a sample of 200 newspaper stories with the following characteristics:  
Table 3.2 
Composition of Coded Media Sample by Circulation Size 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative  
Percent 
Small Town Papers 108 54.0 54.0 
Major Papers 92 46.0 46.0 
 200 100.0 100.0 
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Table 3.3 
Composition of Coded Sample by Type of Story 
 Frequency Percent 
Thematic 75 37.5 
Episodic 82 41.0 
Editorial 43 21.5 
Total  200 100.0 
 
The sampling approach used for this project made it possible to obtain data to address the 
overall research question regarding the media’s familiarity with the national standards and 
protocols for reducing mental illness and suicide. This research project, as stated in the title, had a 
single purpose defined as the sum of two parts (1) media familiarity/knowledge, and (2) mental 
illness/suicide.   It is possible to find evidence of such media familiarity in a lengthy investigative 
article, a brief piece of episodic reporting, or an editorial commentary. Additionally, the five 
LexisNexis content categories (mental health, mental illness, suicide, teen suicide, suicide 
prevention) span the spectrum of language and terminology common to most stories about mental 
illness or suicide prevention. It is possible that the five LexisNexis content categories chosen for 
this study do not include every newspaper article containing the words “suicide” or “mental 
illness.”  Some stories may focus on other issues while making only technical or passing 
reference to mental illness or suicide. This content analysis vetted print media coverage that 
focused directly on the actions of suicidal or mentally persons as well as the overall public health 
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challenges presented by mental illness and suicide. Lastly, the balanced distribution of major 
newspapers and small newspapers allowed for the fact that learned, enterprising news reporting 
takes place at newspapers large and small. Numerous Pulitzer Prizes have been awarded to 
newspapers and journalists whose paid subscription base would be considered “small” by 
LexisNexis and other newspaper databases.  
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Chapter 4:  Results 
This chapter examines the results from the six original research questions. 
        Research Question #1 
Does media coverage of mental health and/or suicide make any reference to any of the 
four national consensus reports that have established the criteria for community mental health 
reform and suicide prevention? 
• 1999 U.S. Surgeon General’s Call To Action 
• 2001 National Strategy on Suicide Prevention 
• 2003 President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health  
• 2012 National Strategy for Suicide Prevention 
 
This does not mean that the author of the sampled stories failed to consult credentialed 
experts regarding community-based intervention. It simply means there is no textual evidence in 
the sample to indicate author familiarity with these major source documents. 
 
Table RQ1.1 
1999 Surgeon General’s Call To Action 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
No 198 99.0 99.0 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
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Table RQ1.2 
2001 National Strategy on Suicide Prevention  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 1 .5 .5 .5 
No 199 99.5 99.5 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
 
Table RQ1.3 
2003 President’s New Freedom Commisson on Mental Health 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Table RQ1.4 
2012 National Strategy for Suicide Prevention 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 4 2.0 2.0 2.0 
No 196 98.0 98.0 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
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Research Question #2 
Do journalists reporting on mental health or suicide seek out the recognized primary 
sources of information regarding general community-based interventions? 
 
• National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) 
• Suicide Prevention Resource Center 
• Scott Poland, Ed.D., Nova Southeastern University 
• Stephen E. Brock, Ph.D., California State University. 
As with RQ1, only a handful of the media samples made reference to the primary sources 
listed as criteria or data points. Sampled stories that mentioned community or school-based 
intervention tended to rely upon statements by local community officials or other mental health 
experts identified independently by the author of the story. Story text did not compare the 
statements of those persons with the protocols outlined in the best-practiced standards. 
 
Table RQ2.1 
National Association of School Psychologists 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 3 1.5 1.5 1.5 
No 197 98.5 98.5 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
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Table RQ2.2 
Suicide Prevention Resource Center 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 3 1.5 1.5 1.5 
No 197 98.5 98.5 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table RQ2.3 
Scott Poland, Ph.D. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table RQ2.4 
Stephen Brock, Ph.D. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Research Question #3 
 
Do journalists writing about mental illness and suicide among young persons seek out 
the primary source of standards developed for schools and universities?  
• National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) 
• Suicide Prevention Resource Center 
• Scott Poland, Ed.D., Nova Southeastern University 
•  Stephen E. Brock, Ph.D., California State University 
 
As with RQ1 and RQ2, only a few of the media samples cited or referenced the major 
sources of school-based intervention.  This finding is of interest because school-based mental 
health intervention typically requires the involvement of certified school psychologists. It would 
be rare to find an elementary or secondary school whose psychologists were not certified by, 
and members of, the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP).  The NASP for 
decades has been the sole developer and publisher of best-practice standards in school crisis 
management, suicide prevention, and mental health screening.  
The likely explanation for this is that schools and school districts employ a wide range 
of educators, administrators, and counselors who present themselves to the media as qualified 
experts on such issues as at-risk children, suicidal children, crisis management after a suicide, 
etc.   Rather than used nationally standardized protocols, most American schools develop their 
own procedures for suicide prevention or postvention (the clinical term for crisis response or 
post-tragedy intervention).  Only journalists with advanced knowledge and expertise on these 
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subjects would find reason to question whether a school’s established policies comply with, or 
conflict with, national best-practice guidelines. For many reporters and many stories, 
information and comments provided by local school personnel would be considered sufficient 
research.  
 
Table RQ3.1 
National Association of School Psychologists 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 3 1.5 1.5 1.5 
No 197 98.5 98.5 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table RQ3.2 
Suicide Prevention Resource Center 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 4 2.0 2.0 2.0 
No 196 98.0 98.0 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
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Table RQ3.3 
Scott Poland 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Table RQ3.4 
Stephen Brock 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Research Question #4 
Does media coverage of mental health and/or suicide cite the need for community 
surveillance/tracking as frequently cited in the nationwide studies? 
Twenty-six news stories contained text that cited the lack of local suicide death statistics 
and/or mental illness incidence in community populations.  The stories were evenly balanced 
between large and small newspapers.  There was no significance difference in the circulation size 
of newspapers where such stories appeared (see Table RQ4.2). 
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It is perhaps of little surprise that this research question was addressed more than another 
other of the six research questions. Statistics and numbers are the bread and butter of news 
journalism. Statistics and statistical trends are routinely presented as useful and newsworthy 
regardless of context or completeness.  Most suicide statistics published by the news media 
represent national or statewide incidence, which have little relevance to suicide trends in a 
specific city or county.  Stories that mentioned the lack of local suicide data did so with little 
discussion about the significance or need for collecting such information.  
The suicide tracking system in Washington County, Oklahoma, was among the few local 
surveillance systems identified in the news sample search.  The system was established after a 
series of media reports that the community suicide rate was twice the national average. In a July 
1, 2012 article in the Bartlesville Examiner-Enterprise, a spokesman for the county health 
department called the local data “staggering” and vowed that a real-time suicide surveillance 
system would be up and running within the week. “With the data,” the spokesman said, “ we will 
be able to look for trends.  Hopefully, we might be able to save lives.” 
 
Table RQ4.1 
Need for surveillance data 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 26 13.0 13.0 13.0 
No 174 87.0 87.0 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
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Table RQ4.2 
Cross-tab: Need for data according to newspaper size 
 Data Needed 
Yes 
Data Needed 
No 
Total 
Small papers 12 96 108 
Large papers 14 78 92 
 26 174 200 
 
Research Question #5 
Do media reports about suicide mention “contagion” or “suicide contagion” 
(sometimes mentioned in discussions of  “copycat” suicides) as a potential health threat 
created by media coverage of suicide? 
The few mentions of contagion are somewhat surprising given that more than half of 
the sample population consisted of sources about suicide or suicide prevention. On the other 
hand, suicide contagion research has consistently found a lack of knowledge about 
contagion among the news media.  Thus, it is unlikely a journalist will ask or write about 
contagion unless the topic is specifically raised by a news source. 
Table RQ5.1 
Mention of suicide contagion or copycat effect 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 4 2.0 2.0 2.0 
No 196 98.0 98.0 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
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Research Question #6 
In stories that discuss suicide contagion theory, do the media seek out recognized 
national experts on this topic or do the media rely upon explanations from persons of 
unknown expertise? 
The frequency result for RQ6 is unsurprising, given that only four media samples 
addressed the issue of contagion.  Of the four samples that referenced contagion, none quoted or 
referenced Dr. Gould or Dr. Poland, the nation’s two leading experts on the subject.  The authors 
of the four stories turned to other suicide experts for information about contagion. 
Table RQ6.1 
RQ6  Madelyn Gould/national expert 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Table RQ6.2 
RQ6  Scott Poland/national expert 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0.0 
No 200 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table RQ6.3 
RQ6  Other national experts on contagion 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
No 198 99.0 99.0 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 6.4 
RQ6  Local non-expert sources 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
No 198 99.0 99.0 100.0 
 200 100.0 100.0  
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This project yielded no evidence of media familiarity with nationally accepted norms 
regarding community mental health care.  More specifically, content analysis of 200 media samples 
found only random reference to the accepted tenets of modern community mental health care as 
found in primary source documents. A small number of samples (<14%) mentioned the lack of local 
data needed to measure the severity and frequency of suicide.  The text of such stories offered no 
indication as to whether local data was unavailable or simply not pursued by the story author. Nor did 
such articles mention the significance of such data as a critical component of local suicide reduction 
efforts, which was among he unanimous findings common to all four of the national consensus 
studies.  In addition, the media sample presented virtually no mention of the four major national 
reports (RQ1) or the stature of these documents as scientific standards, principles, norms, tenets, 
benchmarks or litmus tests. 
While many of the samples dealt with suicide, only four mentioned suicide/media contagion.  
This finding is surprising given the considerable volume of existing research intended to educate 
journalists about the risks of media-induced suicide clusters.  On the other hand, the scare references 
to contagion offers perhaps further evidence of the failure of research-based campaigns designed to 
change how the news media reports and depicts suicide deaths. Contagion research, its successes and 
failures, represents this study’s primary point of departure from existing research. While there exists 
legitimate concern about community publicity that romanticizes suicide or glorifies its victims, there 
is reasonable concern that suicide contagion theory has been given attention far beyond its usefulness, 
or significance, as a vehicle for expanding media understanding of mental illness and suicide. Suicide 
contagion, a contested explanation for a small percentage of all suicides, leaves unaddressed the 
broader and more problematic question addressed by this research investigation:  What is the news 
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media’s level of familiarity with nationwide norms for community mental health care and suicide 
reduction systems?  Put in other words:  Does the media’s current mental health acumen enable it to 
distinguish communities using evidence-based systems from communities using unproven methods 
— thereby enabling media consumers to make the same distinctions.    
Despite this study’s limitations, a number of conclusions are possible about the content 
analysis results. It is possible, for example, that the coding instrument was overly restrictive or 
exclusionary in the selection of criteria used to measure media familiarity.  This would explain 
the small number of samples, across all research questions, containing any mention of the 
criteria data points.  The study could be repeated with different sets of criteria, and various 
criteria combinations. However, there may be implicit defects in the assumption that media 
competence — on any issue — can be justly evaluated by content analysis alone.  The demands 
of time and urgency require journalists to summarize and condense their research methods and 
findings. The demands of such work leave journalists fiercely protective of their right to choose 
sources and facts as they see fit. 
Eschewing “episodic” stories would be a reasonable correction to the methodology used 
in this analysis. Coverage of hard news and breaking stories, by definition, does not offer time 
or space for complex journalistic investigation. A sample comprised solely of thematic or in-
depth stories might generate a population of media samples more commensurate with the goals 
of this research.  Media expertise is best revealed by stories that demand expertise. Narrowing 
the search to thematic stories published by the nation’s 20 or 30 largest newspapers might 
provide the best gauge of media expertise, by examining the expertise of media outlets most 
capable of applying expert resources. 
Other possible explanations for the findings of this investigation: 
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• While there are many trade and specialty health-relation publications, few journalists in the 
print media specialize in health care, let alone mental health coverage.  This may change 
in the coming years as journalists — print, broadcast, and Internet —re-examine their 
understanding of the issues underlying the nation’s recent series of horrific mass 
shootings. Some in the profession argue that the media’s future — and its relevance — 
rests with the ability of the nation’s journalism schools to produce fewer generalists and 
more specialists — reporters with advanced expertise in health, science, the law, the 
environment, and technology, and (USC/Annenberg, 2011). 
• This investigation employed textual analysis criteria regarding the sources and source 
documents utilized in mental health coverage. News stories, unlike academic 
dissertations, do not use footnote and bibliographic documentation.  Journalists present 
readers with thumbnail sketches, of a story, with sources and citations randomly cited.  
The most in-depth treatment of major issues is found in the nation’s top tier of major 
newspapers, magazines, and broadcast media.  A case could be made that useful content 
analysis of media expertise should start with those media most equipped to provide 
highly informed, specialized reporting. 
• The nation’s long and conflicted battle against mental illness notwithstanding, it may be 
premature to form judgments about the mass media’s ability to explain such a complex 
issue using existing journalism methodologies.  Recent national tragedies have 
dramatically increased media attention on the connection between psychopathic violence 
and the failure of community mental health care.  Yanovitkzky research indicates that the 
media’s track record on other social issues demonstrates the long passage of time 
required for social reformers to fully influence media coverage, and for media coverage, 
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in turn, to impact long-term public policy.  Those pursuing social change, Yanovitkzky 
says, must first pursue the media’s attention, patiently and fastidiously convincing the 
media to frame the issue in a manner that compels policymakers to respond.   
• More than two decades of contagion research may have backfired.  Rather than expand 
media understanding of mental illness and encourage more meaningful reporting of 
suicide and its causes, the ceaseless warnings about media-induced suicide clusters may 
have had a chilling effect on the media’s willingness to vigorously pursue suicide as a 
public health issue.  There is palpable irony in the notion that scientific research designed 
to reduce suicide may actually have interfered with suicide prevention efforts by stifling 
public discussion or community intervention. A casual Internet search produces countless 
examples of bitter debate between students and school administrators regarding the 
proper response to student suicides.  Among the source of such controversies is the 
refusal to permit public or permanent memorials (tree markers, yearbook pages, etc.) for 
students who die by suicide (see Appendix B). The ban on such memorials is standard 
text in school crisis management procedures, which typically cite the risk of suicide 
contagion as the basis for bifurcated crisis response procedures  — one set of protocols 
for suicides and a separate set of protocols for all other student tragedies.   
Future Research 
This investigation was a first attempt to measure media competence in the coverage of 
mental illness and suicide. The measurement criteria (the RQ data points) were taken from 
defensible but admittedly subjective conclusions regarding primary sources of information that 
ought to inform and direct media coverage regarding standards for treating the mentally ill and 
preventing suicide.  Applying the principle that framing swings both directions — from media to 
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public and back again — the possibilities are many for future research into media coverage of 
mental health and suicide.  Future research might replicate the methodology using other criteria 
suitable for content analysis.  Such research would then be repeated with yet other criteria until 
the accumulated findings are sufficient to warrant broad conclusions about media competence.  
Such research, however, would remain vulnerable to arguments about media economics and 
structure.  Media coverage of major issues is frequently the work of news generalists who face 
the daily challenge of educating readers about complex issues on behalf of an industry with a 
limited history of personnel specialization.  Only at the largest of the large American newspapers 
does one find highly trained journalists with full-time responsibility for a singular topic. Where 
such specialists are found, the assignment boundaries are broadly drawn — the courts, crime, 
science, education, technology, health, etc.   This author’s Internet searches provided no data on 
the number of media outlets whose mental health coverage is provided by full-time mental health 
specialists.  Replication of this investigation using other textual criteria would expand knowledge 
and understanding of the media’s performance in coverage of major public health issues.  Lack 
of specialization notwithstanding, community journalists know how to obtain facts about a local 
arson fire or a contaminated water supply. Often, the journalist’s toil is rendered effortless by 
media-savvy organizations that engage professional communicators charged with installing 
information management protocols to meet the information needs of local media and local 
residents.  The timely release of such information serves the publishing needs of the media and 
the risk-protection needs of local residents. It would be difficult to find an American community 
not served by such public health alert systems — be it for a measles outbreak among local 
schoolchildren, reports of food poisoning at a popular eatery, or the imminent threat of tornadoes 
and hail storms.   It also would be difficult to find an American community whose public alert 
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systems involved outbreaks of suicide or the needs of the gravely mentally ill.  In most 
communities, such information exists but is not available; all too often, local news media never 
ask why.   
More meaningful research would take a page from Yanovitsky’s “attention” research and 
clearly identify those persons, sources, agencies, institutions with the greatest motive to 
influence media framing of mental health problems and available solutions.  Such research 
would avoid national experts and generalized findings about the quality of mental health care 
nationwide.  Rather, qualitative and quantitative inquiry would focus on the situs of mental 
health care delivery as mandated by existing public policy: American communities.   A small 
number of communities would be sorted into two groups, using search criteria drawn from 
prevailing standards for evidence-based interventions.  The two community groups would be 
labeled “mental health success” and “mental health failure.” A methodology would be 
constructed to search for relationships between media coverage and mental health success, 
between media coverage and mental health failure.  Media coverage content analysis, focus 
group research, and attitude surveys would be designed with the singular focus of identifying 
those community forces that most frequently influence — or attempt to influence — local media 
reporting about mental illness and suicide.  Particularly attention would be given to community 
forces that control the universe of information available to the local media about mental illness 
and suicide.  Such a list would include community mental health care providers, local medical 
examiners,  local legislators, school administrators, and local mental health activists.  The 
greatest challenge of such research would be the difficulty of identifying a sufficiently complete 
list of individuals and agencies with a significant stake in the local media’s framing of “success” 
and “failure.”  Needless to say, those with the greatest motivation to influence media framing 
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will include those most likely to be held accountable for success and failure — generating a list 
of individuals potentially too numerous to manage with traditional focus-group techniques. In 
accordance with Yanovitsky’s theory about the length of time required to win and retain media 
attention, identification of accountable parties would consider each individual’s tenure and 
history as a local influence on mental health care policy. The research findings and cross-
tabulations would look for relationships between: (a) media framing and mental health success;  
(b) media attention/credibility accorded to specific community officials and long-term media 
framing of mental health issues; (c) media framing and media attention paid to non-community 
sources. 
Media messages, media attention 
A more precise understanding of mental health coverage may result from research that 
reaches beyond mere identification of what exists in order to focus attention on what should 
exist. Ample precedence for such an approach is found in the extensive history of scholarly 
research into suicide contagion, the theory that localized suicide clusters can be directly traced to 
reckless local media coverage. Prior to the late 1990s, contagion research was couched in largely 
empirical terms, with the stated purpose of describing media coverage before and after local 
suicides. More recent contagion research involves the testing of various strategies designed to 
change media coverage of suicide.  The media’s predictable indifference to such research efforts 
can be understood by the apparent pointlessness of asking journalists to exercise restraint in 
covering tragedies (imitative suicides) that rarely occur and cannot be documented until long 
after media interest has ceased. Rather than focus on coverage to be avoided, more useful 
research would attempt to identify current impediments to meaningful coverage of mental health 
and suicide.   Such research would require a blend of media content analysis and media focus 
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groups to determine the types of information that would stimulate media understanding of the 
problems and solutions regarding mental illness and suicide.  For example, what impact would 
community-based surveillance data have on media attention to mental illness and suicide?  How 
would local media react to real-time reports on the number of mentally ill persons in the 
community, the number of suicides by age group, or the number of persons requiring inpatient 
mental health treatment v. the community’s supply of inpatient hospital beds? Communities and 
states currently wage campaigns to prevent all kinds of accidents and diseases that afflict far 
fewer people than do mental illness and suicide. Yavinsky’s chronicle of the nation’s auto safety 
movement suggest that the media coverage of mental health issues might be dramatically 
enhanced by a long-term campaign that delivers singular, coherent messages about the lack of 
meaningful mental health and suicide data. As noted in Yavinsky’s analysis of the auto safety 
movement, it is worthwhile to consider the merit of content-analysis research that narrows the 
mental health message to lack of data.  Such research would force journalists to consider “why” 
questions rather than accept “what exists” explanations.  One can only imagine the sparkling 
repartee among journalists participating in a focus group discussion about the likelihood of 
saving countless mental health victims in if no one is counting them. 
Lastly, the literature review indicates that American schools have long been urged to take 
a leading role in the battle against mental illness and suicide.  Until their college years, many 
young people spend more time at school than they do at home, or so it is claimed.  What, then is 
the obligation of schools to identify and protect children presenting signs of depression, suicidal 
thought, or various behavioral disorders?  What community forces most directly influence the 
decision by school administrators to install evidence-based systems for early detection and 
screening of troubled students?  Here, too, it would be worthwhile to use a methodology that 
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seeks similarities and differences between communities considered a “success” in reducing 
suicide and those that have failed to take action. The Suicide Prevention and Resource Center 
maintains a registry of evidence-based suicide prevention programs, which can be used to 
identify schools that have implemented such initiatives and those that have not.  Criteria would 
be established to evaluate the history of local media attention to mental illness and suicide in 
“success” communities as well as “failure” communities.  Where correlations are found between 
media coverage and mental health “success,” focus group research and media interviews would 
be conducted to identify what community or national forces have historically influenced local 
media attention to mental illness and/or suicide. 
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